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It is the hub of UK energy research and the gateway 
between the UK and international energy research 
communities. Its interdisciplinary, whole-systems 
research informs UK policy development and  
research strategy.
•  UKERC’s Meeting Place, based in Oxford, serves  
the whole of the UK research community and its 
popular events, designed to tackle interdisciplinary 
topics and facilitate knowledge exchange and 
collaboration, are regularly oversubscribed –  
www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/TheMeetingPlace
•  The National Energy Research Network provides  
regular updates on news, jobs, events, opportunities 
and developments across the energy field in the  
form of a popular weekly newsletter –  
www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/NERN
•  UKERC’s Research Atlas is the definitive information 
resource for current and past UK energy research and 
development activity.  The online database also has 
information on energy-related research capabilities 
in the UK and a series of energy roadmaps showing 
research problems to be overcome before new 
technologies can be commercially viable –  
http://ukerc.rl.ac.uk
•  UKERC is also the research delivery partner in the 
Technology Strategy Board’s Knowledge Transfer 
Network (KTN) for Energy Generation and Supply,  
with responsibility for analysis of future and  
emerging opportunities. The KTN aims to accelerate  
the innovation of technology across the energy 
generation and supply landscape
•  All UKERC’s publications and articles can be accessed 
via our online Publications Catalogue, which you can 
link to from our home page – www.ukerc.ac.uk
About UKERC
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The UK Energy Research Centre carries out world-class 
research into sustainable energy systems. 
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The aim of the research is to assess the technical, 
economic, financial and social uncertainties facing 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, and  
to analyse the potential role they could play in the UK 
power sector between now and 2030. CCS technologies 
are often highlighted as a crucial component of 
future low carbon energy systems – in the UK and 
internationally. However, it is unclear when these 
technologies will be technically proven at full scale,  
and whether their costs will be competitive with  
other low carbon options. 
The important contribution that CCS technologies  
could make to reducing global carbon emissions has 
been recognised by the UK government for several years. 
There has been a plan to build at least one full scale 
demonstration project since 2006. But, at the time of 
writing, this has not yet resulted in a firm agreement 
to fund a specific project. Last autumn, the planned 
Scottish Power demonstration at the Longannet power 
plant became the latest CCS project to be cancelled. 
Despite continuing public commitments to CCS from 
Ministers, policy, economic and financial uncertainties 
remain a particular concern for investors in the UK –  
and in many other countries where CCS demonstrations 
are planned. The re-launch of the £1bn fund for CCS 
demonstration projects in April 2012, alongside a 
roadmap for the commercialisation of CCS technologies, 
may signal a decisive turning point in UK policy. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the measures 
within the roadmap, and the generous package of 
financial support that is now available, will be  
sufficient to make CCS a commercial reality.
Against this policy background, this report systematically 
examines the uncertainties facing CCS technologies 
in the UK. It uses historical evidence to explore these 
uncertainties, and the conditions under which they can 
be at least partly resolved. The historical evidence base 
comprises nine case studies, each of which focuses on 
a technology that is partly analogous to CCS. The report 
draws on this evidence to develop potential pathways 
for CCS in the UK to 2030, and uses this analysis to draw 
conclusions for current policies and strategies. 
 
 
The report reaches three general conclusions. First, our 
historical case studies show that uncertainties can be 
reduced sufficiently for progress to be made. In some 
cases, they can be resolved entirely. This offers some 
optimism that, given the right set of circumstances, the 
uncertainties that affect CCS can also be dealt with. 
However, care is needed when learning from historical 
contexts that differ widely from the current situation 
in the UK. Second, interactions between uncertainties 
matter. They can reinforce each other, both positively 
and negatively. There can also be tradeoffs between 
uncertainties where attempts to resolve one uncertainty 
could result in the exacerbation of others. Third, the 
resolution of all uncertainties is not required for CCS 
to be financeable in the UK. Similarly, the derailing of 
plans to realise the potential of CCS may not require 
everything to go wrong – but this could be caused by a 
‘critical mass’ of uncertainties persisting for too long. 
The important contribution that 
CCS technologies could make to 
reducing global carbon emissions 
has been recognised by the UK 
government for several years. 
Executive summary
This report summarises the findings of the two-year 
UKERC research project: Carbon capture and storage: 
realising the potential?
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A regulatory approach will 
only work if technologies are 
sufficiently well developed and 
the additional costs can be 
passed on to consumers.
The report also concludes that if CCS is to 
be a low carbon option for the UK in future, 
comprehensive policy support is required now 
to reduce the uncertainties we have identified. 
In particular, the re-launched demonstration 
programme needs to yield firm commitments to 
build several projects as soon as possible. Even 
if such progress is made, there will be difficult 
choices for government and other decision 
makers. Our research has highlighted four areas 
where such choices need to be made: 
1.  Keeping options open or closing them down? 
Whilst strong policy signals and support are 
required for CCS, there are also risks associated 
with accelerated innovation and deployment. It is 
tempting to focus resources on one technological 
variety early on as the French government did 
with the PWR for its nuclear programme. This may 
help to speed up development, but comes with 
increased risks of picking inferior technology. It is 
too early for government and industry to close down 
on a particular variant of CCS technology. Several 
substantial demonstration projects are needed, for 
example so that uncertainties associated with scaling 
up and system integration can be tackled.
2.  Which public policy incentives for CCS 
demonstration and deployment? 
A menu of options is available for public policy 
support of CCS technologies. A regulatory approach 
will only work if technologies are sufficiently well 
developed and the additional costs can be passed on 
to consumers. CCS technologies are not yet at this 
stage. In the meantime, the government is right to 
emphasise the need for demonstrations. Public finance 
for these demonstrations should be designed to 
maximise performance rather than novelty. Since not 
all demonstrations are likely to perform as expected, 
systematic learning and evaluation by government is 
also essential. 
 
3.  CCS deployment as a marathon, not a sprint. 
Our historical case studies show that developing new 
energy technologies can take a long time. Their costs do 
not necessarily fall from the first day they are deployed. 
Whilst learning can bring costs down, costs can rise for 
several years first as technologies are scaled up. Whilst 
this requires some patience, it is therefore important 
to monitor progress carefully to inform decisions on 
whether to continue with public funding – or, if there  
is little sign of positive progress over a prolonged period 
of time, when to divert resources to other options. 
4.  Dealing with storage liabilities 
Our case study of UK nuclear waste management policy 
has highlighted how complex liability arrangements 
for CO2 storage could be. For CCS, a balance needs to 
be struck between limiting liabilities for investors (so 
that they will be able to invest in full scale CCS plants) 
and protecting the interests of future taxpayers (who 
should not be un-necessarily exposed to liabilities). 
Agreements are therefore needed about how liabilities 
should be divided, when a privately run storage site 
should revert back to the State, what arrangements are 
needed to fund potential liabilities, and what insurance 
site operators may require. The nuclear experience 
suggests that an independently managed fund may  
be required for carbon storage liabilities.
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Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technologies are often highlighted 
as a crucial component of future 
low carbon energy systems – in the 
UK and internationally. However, 
they are still being developed and 
demonstrated. 
Introduction
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06 Chapter 01 Introduction
This report summarises the findings of the two-year 
UKERC research project: ‘Carbon capture and storage: 
realising the potential?’. The aim of the project is to 
conduct an independent, inter-disciplinary assessment 
of the technical, economic, financial and social 
uncertainties facing CCS, and to analyse the potential 
role CCS could play in the UK power sector between 
now and 2030. The report summarises the main findings 
of the project, and complements other more detailed 
outputs1 . It is designed to fulfil one of the main project 
rationales, which is to inform UK government policies 
for CCS as well as the strategies of investors and other 
stakeholders. 
The report addresses four main questions which were 
agreed early on following discussion with the project’s 
stakeholder steering group:
1. What are the key uncertainties for CCS technologies?
2. How can these uncertainties be analysed effectively?
3. What can experience from history tell us?
4.  Applying this knowledge, under what conditions are 
CCS technologies likely to be ‘financeable’ in the UK?
The report is structured as follows. The remainder of 
section 1 sets out the global context for CCS technologies, 
and analyses the recent history of UK policies to support 
these technologies. Section 2 then explains how the 
main uncertainties for CCS were identified by the project 
team, their scope, and how they can be assessed. Section 
3 draws on the nine case studies that were used to 
explore these uncertainties, each of which focuses on a 
technology that is partly analogous to CCS. The section 
reflects on the lessons these cases have for CCS policies 
and strategies, and identifies important interactions 
between the different uncertainties. Based on the insights 
from the case study analysis, section 4 develops a number 
of potential CCS pathways for the UK to 2030. It also 
suggests a number of important branching points, where 
decisions could make a significant difference to the 
contribution of CCS plants to the future UK electricity mix. 
Section 5 concludes by summarising the main insights 
from the project and by setting out some important 
implications for policy and for other decision makers.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies are often 
highlighted as a crucial component of future low carbon 
energy systems – in the UK and internationally. 
However, they are still being developed and 
demonstrated. It is therefore unclear when these 
technologies will be technically proven at full scale, and 
whether their costs will be competitive with other low 
carbon options. 
CCS technologies are conceptually straightforward: they 
are designed to remove up to 90% of the carbon dioxide  
(CO2) from fossil fuel power plants or industrial facilities 
such as steel mills, and to store the CO2 underground. 
Carbon dioxide is therefore prevented from entering 
the atmosphere and contributing to climate change. 
A carbon capture and storage system consists of three 
main components: 1) a capture plant to remove CO2 
from a power plant or industrial facility before or after 
fuel is burned; 2) infrastructure such as a pipeline to 
transport the captured CO2 to a storage site; and 3) 
an underground storage site which will typically be a 
depleted hydrocarbon field or a saline aquifer.
1 For these more detailed outputs, see the UKERC website www.ukerc.ac.uk
For their supporters, CCS 
technologies offer a crucial way 
to square the continued use of 
fossil fuels with climate change 
mitigation. According to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) 
World Energy Outlook in 2011, 
fossil fuels will continue to supply 
the majority of the world’s energy 
to 2035, even if climate change 
mitigation is taken very seriously 
(IEA, 2011).
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The promise of carbon capture and storage
For their supporters, CCS technologies offer a crucial way 
to square the continued use of fossil fuels with climate 
change mitigation. According to the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook in 2011, fossil fuels 
will continue to supply the majority of the world’s energy 
to 2035, even if climate change mitigation is taken very 
seriously (IEA, 2011). The IEA ‘450 scenario’ considers a 
global energy system trajectory that has a significant 
chance of limiting average temperature increases to 
2ºC. Under this scenario, CCS would be fitted to 32% 
of the world’s coal fired power plant capacity (410GW 
out of 1270GW) by 2035, and 10% of global gas fired 
capacity (210GW out of 2110GW) by the same date. CCS 
technologies would therefore account for 22% of the 
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2035 when compared to 
the IEA’s alternative ‘new policies scenario’ in which 
global greenhouse gas emissions would continue to rise. 
Whilst the IEA’s scenarios only represent one view of the 
future, many other scenarios that limit global average 
temperature rises to 2ºC include a prominent role for 
CCS technologies (German Advisory Council on Global 
Change, 2011). However, whilst many governments 
and companies are now funding and developing CCS 
technologies, there is a long way to go before we 
know whether such a role for CCS will be technically 
and economically feasible. Pilot scale capture plants 
are in operation in several countries, CO2 is routinely 
transported across large distances in the United States, 
and CO2 is being injected successfully at a number of 
storage sites. But full scale CCS plants are thin on the 
ground. A recent survey by the Global CCS Institute 
identified eight large scale integrated CCS projects that 
are already in operation around the world (Global CCS 
Institute, 2011). These focus on gas processing, synthetic 
fuels and fertiliser production – applications that are 
less technically demanding and more economically 
attractive than CCS in the power sector. According to the 
IEA, ‘incorporating CCS into a power plant increases the 
levelised cost of the electricity produced by between 39% 
and 64%, depending on the technology and fuel source’ 
(IEA, 2011: 378). This increase is expected for two main 
reasons. First, the incremental capital costs of adding 
CCS to a fossil fuel power plant are substantial. A recent 
Mott Macdonald study estimated that the direct costs 
of adding carbon capture to a coal-fired plant could be 
£335-£900/kW, depending on the capture technology 
used (Mott MacDonald, 2011). This would take total 
capital costs to £2500-£2800/kW. For a gas fired combined 
cycle plant (a CCGT), the direct cost increase would be 
around £480/kW (taking the total capital cost to £1000/
kW). The gas CCS capital costs are lower than those 
of any other power plant technology assessed by Mott 
MacDonald, whilst the coal CCS costs are higher than the 
estimate for onshore wind, but lower than estimates for 
offshore wind and nuclear power. The second reason for 
an increase in the cost of electricity from fossil plants 
with CCS is that the energy penalty of including carbon 
capture in a power plant is significant. Mott MacDonald’s 
report states that this is around 10 percentage points. For 
example, this would reduce a coal-fired plant efficiency 
of 42% to 32%.
Given these economically unattractive attributes, it is 
not surprising that there are currently no full scale CCS 
demonstrations in operation at coal- or gas-fired power 
plants. The first two are currently under construction 
in the United States and Canada, underpinned by 
substantial government financial support. Plans for a 
number of other CCS power plants have recently been 
cancelled, including the Longannet plant in Scotland and 
the Jänschwalde plant in Germany. Whilst economic and 
financial factors were significant in the decision to cancel 
the Longannet plant, the cancellation of Jänschwalde 
followed public protests against the planned use of 
onshore   storage. As the Global CCS Institute emphasises 
economic and policy factors in its most recent report on 
large scale projects:
‘The most frequently cited reason for a project being put 
on-hold or cancelled is that it was deemed uneconomic 
in its current form and policy environment. The lack 
of financial support to continue to the next stage of 
project development and uncertainty regarding carbon 
abatement policies were critical factors that led several 
project proponents to reprioritise their investments, 
either within their CCS portfolio or to alternative 
technologies’ 
(Global CCS Institute, 2011: 13).
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2 Updates on the NER 300 process are available on the website of the European Commission Directorate General for Climate Action:  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/funding/ner300/index_en.htm.
The UK policy context 
The important role that CCS technologies could play 
in achieving global carbon emissions reductions has 
also been recognised in recent UK policy debates. 
Successive governments have emphasised a potential 
role for CCS technologies since the early 2000s (eg DTI, 
2003). The 2005 Carbon Abatement Technology Strategy 
(DTI, 2005) suggested a potentially substantial role 
for CCS in the UK if fossil fuels were retained in the 
energy mix. This was followed in November 2007 by the 
launch of a competition to build the UK’s first full-scale 
demonstration plant, which would be operational by 
2014. The aim was to ‘make the UK a world leader in 
this globally important technology’ (DECC, 2009; DTI, 
2007:15). The competition was narrowly defined, and 
specified that it would only fund a demonstration of 
post-combustion capture on a coal-fired power station. 
Nevertheless, nine competing projects were proposed.  
At the pre-qualification stage, the number was reduced 
to four. By November 2009, just two bidders remained 
(NAO, 2012). 
The 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review confirmed 
that the newly elected Coalition Government would 
provide up to £1bn for the successful demonstration 
project. But on the same day as this announcement 
was made, E.ON withdrew from the competition on 
the grounds that the economic conditions were not 
right. This left Scottish Power’s Longannet project as 
the only remaining competitor. The Spending Review 
also confirmed that the government reaffirmed 
the commitment made by the previous Labour 
administration to expand the CCS demonstration 
programme to include up to four projects including the 
initial demonstration. However, it also cast doubt on the 
‘CCS levy’ on consumer bills that Labour had introduced 
to pay for these further projects.
As part of the policy process of reviewing financing 
arrangements for the demonstration programme, the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
completed a market sounding exercise. This was 
designed to ‘help the Department to explore workable 
options for the CCS demonstration project selection 
and funding processes, and learn about projects 
being considered by industry’ (DECC, 2010b). A key 
development was the decision to make gas-fired 
generation eligible for the competition, following 
recommendations by the Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC, 2011a). In addition, a decision was made to shelve 
the CCS levy on consumer bills. This meant that CCS 
funding would be bound up with the broader Electricity 
Market Reform (EMR) process that was being developed 
to improve the incentives for low carbon generation 
investment. In common with support for CCS itself, this 
broader process of market reform has had cross-party 
support, and was inherited by the current Government 
from its predecessor.
Support for CCS is also planned from the European 
Commission via the new entrant reserve within the 
EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). This funding is 
commonly referred to as the ‘NER 300’, and is planned 
to be made available from the EU-wide auctioning of 
300 million EU ETS allowances. At the time of writing, 
decisions have not yet been made about which projects 
the Commission intends to support through this scheme, 
and the due diligence assessments of projects that have 
applied for funding are not public.
At the time, DECC’s aspiration was that the 
demonstration projects would facilitate CCS technologies 
being ready for commercial deployment by 2020, and in 
particular, that the further three projects would assist in 
the ‘transition to commercial viability’ after the ‘initial 
demonstration at commercial scale’ provided by the  
first project (DECC, 2010c:17). This position reflected 
the UK Government’s view that CCS had the potential 
to make a major contribution to meeting the UK’s CO2 
reduction targets:
‘By 2020 well over half of the UK’s electricity generation 
will still be fuelled by coal and gas. That is why CCS is 
such a crucial element of this Government’s energy and 
climate change agenda. It is the only technology that 
can significantly reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
power stations - by as much as 90%. IEA analysis has 
shown that without CCS, halving global emissions by 
2050 will be 70 per cent more expensive. And it will play 
an important role in balancing the electricity system - 
underpinning intermittent and less flexible contributors 
like wind and nuclear.’  
(DECC, 2011c)
However, in October 2011, Scottish Power confirmed that 
it had decided to withdraw the Longannet project from 
the first demonstration plant competition. DECC cited 
increased costs and the inability to reach a commercial 
agreement as the reasons. In a critical report on lessons 
for the government from the competition, the National 
Audit Office cited a number of contributory factors to 
the collapse of the project (NAO, 2012). These included 
poor commercial awareness within government, a lack of 
capacity to procure such large, complex projects, a lack 
of flexibility with respect to project specifications and the 
lack of a business case for the competition.
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The Energy Minister Charles 
Hendry MP confirmed this longer 
term perspective in a recent 
speech. He emphasised ‘the UK 
Government’s firm commitment 
to Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) and our determination to 
see the technology ready to be 
commercially deployed in the 
2020s’ (Hendry, 2012).
DECC moved quickly to confirm that the £1bn set aside 
for the first demonstration would be ‘available for a 
new process’ (DECC, 2011b). In the 2011 Carbon Plan, 
the government stated that it foresees up to 10GW of 
CCS plants in the UK by 2030 (DECC, 2011d). This is 
significantly lower than the 20-30GW called for by the 
CCS industry by 2030 (CCSA, 2011). The government’s 
view is perhaps more dependent on what happens to 
other low carbon options. The Carbon Plan states that 
the overall objective is to ‘run a low carbon technology 
race between CCS, renewables and nuclear power’ 
(DECC, 2011d: 72). The Energy Minister Charles Hendry 
MP confirmed this longer term perspective in a recent 
speech. He emphasised ‘the UK Government’s firm 
commitment to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and 
our determination to see the technology ready to be 
commercially deployed in the 2020s’ (Hendry, 2012). 
This was reinforced in April 2012, with the re-launch of 
the demonstration programme – which has now been 
renamed ‘CCS Commercialisation Programme’ – and the 
publication of a CCS roadmap (DECC, 2012b).
As the CCS roadmap has confirmed, current financial 
support available for CCS projects is a combination of 
the £1billion available in capital funding, incentives from 
the package of policies under EMR, and additional funds 
from the NER300 process. According to DECC’s roadmap, 
eligible projects for this financial support do not 
necessarily need to include all components of a full CCS 
system. They can be ‘full-chain or part-chain that can 
demonstrate the prospect of being part of a full-chain 
project in the future’ (DECC 2012b: 28).
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At the heart of the EMR package are long-term contracts 
for low-carbon electricity. These contracts are designed 
to stabilise and top up the revenues of low-carbon 
generators such as CCS, transferring electricity price risk 
from generators to consumers, through a Contract for 
Difference (CfD). It is intended that the precise design 
of the CfD will evolve as CCS matures, moving from 
demonstration to commercial baseload deployment, 
and then potentially to flexible operation (DECC, 2011a). 
In addition to these contracts, a carbon price floor is 
proposed. This is a fiscal instrument that aims to reduce 
uncertainty for investors and incentivise low-carbon 
generation by topping up the EU ETS carbon price. 
However, it should not have a direct impact on total 
revenues received by CCS and other plants through the 
contracts for difference. Enacted through reform of the 
Climate Change Levy, the floor will begin at £15.70/tCO2 
in 2013. It is envisaged that it will rise gradually to £30/
tCO2 in 2020, and then to £70/tCO2 in 2030 (real 2009 
prices). CO2 that is captured and stored via CCS will be 
exempt from the tax (HMT, 2011). 
Two further mechanisms are proposed as part of the EMR 
package. The first of these is an Emissions Performance 
Standard (EPS), intended to be a regulatory backstop 
which puts an annual limit on the amount of CO2 that 
a plant can emit, equivalent to 450gCO2/kWh for plant 
operating at baseload. In this way, the EPS reinforces 
the current government’s policy that no new coal plant 
can be built without demonstrating CCS, but does not 
prevent the construction of new unabated gas fired 
CCGT plants. Existing plants are fully grandfathered, 
meaning that they are not subject to the 450gCO2/
kWh level. Plants consented after the EPS comes into 
force will be subject to the 450gCO2/kWh level, but will 
receive protection from future changes to the EPS for 
a specified time period. The government has recently 
confirmed that gas plants built once the EPS is in force 
will be grandfathered until 2045 (DECC, 2012). This leads 
to significant questions about the compatibility of this 
policy with the UK’s climate change targets. Applying 
this rule to a large number of gas fired plants could take 
up a significant proportion of the UK’s carbon budgets.
DECC has signalled that the EPS might be lowered in the 
future, as a means to requiring full CCS on new fossil 
fuel plant. Finally, DECC has indicated that a capacity 
mechanism will be introduced to target the problem of 
resource adequacy, ie how to secure sufficient reliable 
capacity to cover peak demand. However, a firm decision 
has not been made on its design; instead, the White 
Paper launched a further consultation on this instrument 
(DECC, 2011a).
In addition to challenges associated with the current 
financial climate, there are a number of factors which 
potentially limit the ‘financeability’ of CCS in the UK (and 
in other countries with liberalised market structures). 
These factors are summarised below. The project team 
assessed them through a combination of an analysis of 
stakeholder responses to consultations and inquiries 
(DECC, 2010a; DECC, 2010b; ECCC, 2010; ECCC, 2011; HMT, 
2011) and stakeholder interviews carried out during 
Summer 2011 (Jones, 2011).
1. Technology and construction risk:
Stakeholder interviews revealed technology and 
construction risk to be a particularly important factor 
deterring investment at present. The multiplicity of CCS 
technologies, each of which has differing technological 
characteristics, makes this factor especially difficult to 
tackle. Stakeholders expressed concerns that delays to 
the Demonstration Programme and the EMR’s emphasis 
on performance-related support are exacerbating  
this risk. 
The 2010 Comprehensive  
Spending Review confirmed  
that the newly elected Coalition 
Government would provide  
up to £1bn for the successful 
demonstration project.
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2. High capital cost: 
As noted earlier, CCS has high up-front capital costs. 
These estimates are also associated with significant 
uncertainty due to CCS’s status as a new technology. 
A recent review of cost estimates for CCS technologies 
over the last ten years shows that there are large 
differences between studies (see Figure 1.1). Whilst 
recent design studies funded by the UK government for 
the proposed demonstration projects at Longannet and 
Kingsnorth argued that they had reduced uncertainty 
about costs, more generic cost estimates do not show 
such convergence. The importance of this factor to 
stakeholders is reflected in their concerns about the level 
of additional revenue they will receive through a future 
contract for difference, and their emphasis on securing 
NER 300 co-funding for demonstration projects.
3. Infrastructure constraints: 
Stakeholders discussed a number of infrastructural 
barriers to CCS investment. These include widespread 
first-of-a-kind costs associated with developing a CO2 
transportation network, and the lack of a systematic 
approach to optimising the network through a co-
ordinated approach and pipeline oversizing. There 
are also more general uncertainties about storage 
infrastructure, the capacity of storage sites and the 
associated legal liabilities for CO2 storage. 
4. Fuel price risk: 
CCS has significant and variable fuel-related operating 
costs which are exacerbated by the high ‘energy 
penalty’ that means a significant reduction in power 
plant efficiency. Fossil fuel plants are typically ‘price 
makers’, with the ability to pass fuel price increases on 
to consumers. This is because fuel prices and electricity 
prices tend to rise at the same time. However, there 
are clear stakeholder concerns that the contracts for 
difference support mechanism that is planned under 
EMR may remove this natural hedge for CCS plants to 
rising fuel prices, for example by placing an upper limit 
on the income they can receive for each kWh of power 
they produce.
5. Load factor risk: 
CCS has relatively high operating and fuel costs, which 
may mean that load factor risk could become important 
in the 2020s. In particular, CCS plant might be required to 
operate flexibly when there is increased deployment of 
very low marginal cost nuclear and wind power plants. 
This has the potential to increase the unit costs of CCS 
generation, thus undermining the attractiveness of CCS 
investments. This risk is potentially greater for coal CCS 
than gas CCS, due to the higher capital intensity of coal.
6. Storage risk:
CCS requires the storage of CO2. A pilot project or a 
full-scale commercial project will not proceed without 
guaranteed storage for the entire project lifetime output. 
There have been several compilations of potential 
storage capacity in the UK.  All these have assessed this 
capacity at a preliminary level, and are optimistic about 
the size of UK storage resources. As of 2012, there are few 
proven or validated storage reservoirs for CO2 storage in 
the UK.  Stakeholders with expertise in the subsurface 
development of hydrocarbon resources point out that 
there are unsolved issues of reservoir connectivity.
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3 This resonates with a much earlier observation which, although not specifically aimed at investment in CCS, seems particularly apt: ‘If governments 
wish to stimulate investment, perhaps the worst thing they can do is to spend a long time discussing the right way to do so’ (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).
Where projects are partly 
dependent on borrowing to 
finance them, they must also 
compete with a broader range of 
potential investments – including 
investments outside the UK and 
in other sectors of the economy. 
For utility companies considering very large investments 
in very long-lived assets, many of these characteristics 
are unattractive. CCS projects must compete internally 
within these companies for capital, and must therefore 
be competitive with alternative investments in electricity 
generation in the UK and abroad. Where projects are 
partly dependent on borrowing to finance them, they 
must also compete with a broader range of potential 
investments – including investments outside the UK 
and in other sectors of the economy. Taken together, 
these factors may constrain the investment available to 
CCS projects. Over the long-term, investors will require 
that fuel price risk and load factor risk are addressed. 
Yet the crucial factors limiting CCS ‘financeability’ 
at present relate to the early-stage nature of CCS; in 
particular, technology and construction risk, capital cost, 
infrastructural constraints, and uncertainties about the 
extent and sharing of legal liabilities are the key barriers 
to investment. Thus, the most important conditions 
in the near-term are (1) that CCS is successfully 
demonstrated at commercial scale, and (2) that ‘2nd 
tranche’ projects receive support in the transition to 
commercial readiness. 
On paper, it would seem that these two most 
significant conditions are being addressed. The CCS 
Commercialisation Programme should help to reduce 
technology risks, to provide greater certainty over capital 
costs, and develop infrastructure, via commercial-scale 
projects. Following this, the EMR package of policies 
could continue to offer support for ‘2nd tranche’ projects, 
assuming that the CfD strike price is high enough. The 
basic framework for widespread CCS deployment by 2030 
is thus in place. Yet the CCS investment climate remains 
fragile. Investors are dependent on government support 
to co-fund CCS demonstration, and have been concerned 
that in the current challenging financial environment, 
funding might be constrained or postponed. These 
concerns were particularly high following the shelving of 
the CCS levy, the delays in the demonstration programme, 
and the precedent set by postponed projects abroad.
The key omission at present, then, is perhaps not so 
much an adequate policy framework, especially now 
that the CCS roadmap has finally been published. It 
is rather the confidence that this framework will be 
implemented with mechanisms that recognise the 
unique characteristics of CCS and within the timescales 
required. As one industry stakeholder explained, there 
has been a lack of ‘a sense of urgency’3. Given that the 
extent of CCS deployment in the 2020s depends on the 
pace of demonstration in the 2010s, these concerns could 
have significant implications for future decarbonisation. 
It remains to be seen whether the measures within the 
CCS roadmap, and the generous package of financial 
support that is now available, will be sufficient to 
significantly boost the confidence of investors.
The identification of key 
uncertainties for CCS technologies 
was an iterative process. The 
aim was to identify which 
aspects of CCS are perceived 
as most uncertain, and which 
uncertainties were thought 
to be important for the future 
development of the technology. 
Analysing the key  
uncertainties for CCS 
technologies
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The identification of key uncertainties for CCS 
technologies was an iterative process. 
The aim was to identify which aspects of CCS are 
perceived as most uncertain, and which uncertainties 
were thought to be important for the future development 
of the technology. The research aimed to address 
a practical problem for policy makers and other 
decision makers: how to deal with uncertainties for 
CCS innovation. With this in mind, an initial list of 
uncertainties across a range of technical, political, 
financial, legal and social aspects was drafted by the 
project team. For this, and throughout the research 
process, the work drew on the inter-disciplinary 
expertise on CCS and innovation within the research 
team, which includes geology, engineering, legal and 
financial and innovation studies.
The draft list of uncertainties was further refined and 
tested in an iterative process with several steps. In line 
with contemporary technology assessment practice 
emphasising engagement with practitioners (Schot and 
Rip, 1997; Guston and Sarewitz, 2002; Genus, 2006), the 
list was revised after consultation with the project’s 
steering group, which included a range of experts from 
industry, policy and academia4. The preliminary list 
was also presented at the largest international CCS 
conference, Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies 
(Markusson, Kern et al., 2011). The list of uncertainties 
was also revised reflecting the insights from a literature 
review and an investigation of technology assessment 
practice as described below.
 
A social science literature review (including literature on 
CCS economics) was undertaken in June 2010 to establish 
what is known about CCS uncertainties, as well as 
more fundamental insights about how to conceptualise 
and understand them (Markusson, Kern et al., 2012). 
Exclusion of papers that are not relevant (eg because 
they were purely technical or only mentioned CCS in 
passing) yielded a set of 74 social science papers. This 
enabled the review of some of the CCS uncertainties, 
for example public understanding, as they have been 
more extensively studied by social scientists. Where 
there was little social science research, for example 
on system integration, general innovation studies and 
policy literature were used. This literature has codified 
the experience from other technologies, which is of 
potential use for the analysis of CCS. It also offers a way 
of relating the results of this work to wider research on 
technological innovation. 
4 See the Acknowledgements section of this report for a full list of steering group members
To further focus and ground the framework in an 
understanding of how actors assess new technologies 
in practice, 14 interviews with technology stakeholder 
representatives were conducted. These were individuals 
from different relevant industries and organisations 
including utilities, engineering consultancies, finance, 
insurance, legal professionals, regulators and policy 
makers that are knowledgeable about how new 
technologies are assessed in their organisations 
and sectors. A list of the organisations that were 
interviewed is provided in an appendix to this report. The 
interviews were further complemented with a review 
of technology assessment documents. This included 
general assessment methods, including procedures for 
determining Best Available Technology and Technology 
Readiness Assessments, as well as CCS specific 
assessments and roadmaps.
During the process of refining the list of uncertainties, a 
large number of uncertainty candidates were identified 
and discussed. The most important uncertainties 
were selected by the research team – and the precise 
definitions and delimitations of the uncertainties 
were revised – again in consultation with the project’s 
stakeholder steering group. The resulting robust list of 
seven key uncertainties for CCS innovation is as follows: 
1. Variety of pathways
2. Safe storage
3. Scaling up and speed of development and deployment
4. Integration of CCS systems
5. Economic and financial viability
6. Policy, politics and regulation
7. Public acceptance.
Each of these uncertainties will be described very briefly 
below. For a more elaborate analysis of the different 
uncertainties, see Markusson, Kern et al. (2012).
Uncertainty 1: Variety of CCS pathways 
There is technological diversity for each of the 
components of the CCS chain – for example in types 
of capture, in modes of CO2 transport, and in types of 
storage facility. Competition among technologies is 
normal and good for learning, but will most likely be 
reduced as widespread deployment approaches. There 
is uncertainty as to what technologies will win out, and 
when that will happen. This raises dilemmas for the 
relevant actors (eg investors and government) in terms 
of what technologies to invest in at different points 
in this development. Early selection may get outdated 
quickly, stranding actors with uncompetitive assets, and/
or locking CCS into inferior technologies. Governments 
need to balance the need for experimentation with the 
need for fast development and deployment and perhaps 
premature closure of technological choices.
The research aimed to address  
a practical problem for policy 
makers and other decision  
makers: how to deal with  
uncertainties for CCS innovation. 
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Uncertainty 2: Safe storage 
One of the key uncertainties with CCS is whether storage 
will prove to be secure over long periods of time. While 
some of the components of CCS have been applied in 
industrial settings, geological carbon storage represents 
new challenges. Storage risk has two dimensions: local 
environmental, health and safety risks and the global 
risk of carbon dioxide re-entering the atmosphere 
undermining climate change goals (Pollak and Wilson, 
2009). There is uncertainty about probabilities and 
risks and a lack of experience with geological storage 
by developers, regulators and researchers. These risks 
vary across storage options and settings. Developing 
appropriate, credible and long term mechanisms to deal 
with risks and their associated liabilities is therefore 
essential for the deployment of CCS to be successful.
Uncertainty 3: Scaling up and speed of 
development and deployment
CCS should ideally be ready for implementation within 
the next decade. This includes having the required 
knowledge, but also the skills, industries, institutions, 
etc. Key technologies also need to be scaled up. The 
complexities involved include if and when we will see 
dominant designs emerge; how much competition 
there will be among competing technologies (eg capture 
variants and storage options), and if components can be 
developed and scaled in parallel with each other. There is 
a need to know how we can assess whether development 
and scaling up will be possible and if it can happen fast 
enough. It is also important to assess whether top-down, 
government steering could speed this up.
Uncertainty 4: Integration of CCS systems
CCS exists today as sets of components, types of 
expertise, etc. Integrating these into working CCS 
systems raises technical issues, for example limiting the 
impurity concentrations allowable for transportation. It 
also brings social challenges in terms of coordinating the 
actors that are developing and operating CCS systems. 
These technical and social aspects are likely to be related 
(Hughes, 1983). System coordination is also complex in 
that the different activities involved are likely to require 
different modes of coordination and organisation. 
Examples include the operation of CCS systems, 
supporting R&D, and verification of storage for CO2  
trading. Also, coordination may differ at the component 
versus system levels. Possible models of coordination 
of CCS development and operation vary with regard 
to the degree of market orientation, centralisation, 
fragmentation, participation, etc.
Uncertainty 5: Economic and financial 
viability
One of the key uncertainties of CCS is its future 
economic and financial viability for investors. A 
technology is economically viable if it has a positive cost-
benefit ratio. Even if a technology is economically viable, 
that does not necessarily mean that it is financially 
viable because the expected pattern of cash-flows is not 
easily defined, thereby increasing the cost of capital. The 
technology may have associated risks which make it 
less attractive than investing in alternative low carbon 
forms of energy (Gross, Blyth et al, 2007). Economic 
and financial viability is therefore a key uncertainty for 
businesses as well as policy makers, and will determine 
their willingness to invest in CCS. Improving economic 
and financial viability is an important rationale for policy 
support.
Uncertainty 6: Policy, politics and regulation
Uncertainty about CCS development is not only due to 
economic or technical factors, but is also due to political 
factors. In this context, specific policy instruments which 
could help CCS to develop, and the political processes of 
getting acceptance, legitimacy and continued support for 
CCS are all important. There are also related questions 
about regulatory frameworks that are required to deal 
with liabilities, safety rules and so on. These factors are 
important because in part the future development of 
CCS will depend on explicit political and policy choices. 
As James Meadowcroft and Oluf Langhelle argue, ‘a 
strong regulatory push and/or a significant price for 
carbon emissions will be required to develop commercial 
applications’ (Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2009: 9).
Uncertainty 7: Public acceptance
Another key uncertainty around the development of CCS 
is whether CCS will be seen as a legitimate technology 
for climate change mitigation. The existing literature 
stresses that societal acceptance is widely recognized 
as an important factor influencing the successful 
development and diffusion of new technologies (Huijts, 
Midden et al., 2007; van Alphen, Voorst et al., 2007; 
Shackley, Reiner et al., 2009). It also highlights that such 
acceptance partly depends on the ‘fairness of processes 
governing decisions’ (McLaren, 2011: 2) about new 
technologies, which can help to take divergent views 
into account. There are examples, such as genetically 
modified organisms in the United States, where a 
technology has been deployed in spite of some public 
resistance – and fair processes do not necessarily resolve 
such controversies. Public acceptance is not just a matter 
of individual preferences, but is also the result of social 
interactions.
Existing social science CCS publications tend to focus 
on a particular uncertainty such as public acceptance 
(eg Shackley, McLachlan et al., 2005) or costs (eg Rubin, 
Chen et al., 2007). They do not tend to analyse CCS 
uncertainties across the board and their interactions over 
time. However, the uncertainty dimensions studied are 
clearly not independent of each other, and the broader 
framework developed here allows interactions between 
them to be identified.
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Finally, to guide the assessment of CCS uncertainties 
with more precision, qualitative and quantitative 
indicators were identified (see Table 2.1). The 
identification and selection of assessment indicators 
drew heavily on the interviews with technology 
stakeholder representatives with practical experience  
of assessing technologies and the document and 
literature review. 
The indicators are not designed to be comprehensive, 
but were chosen to aid the analysis of the project’s 
historical case studies in a systematic and comparable 
way (see Section 3 of this report). Since the uncertainties 
are related to each other, some indicators are used for 
multiple uncertainties.
 
Table 2.1: List of uncertainties and indicators
1. Variety of pathways
The diversity of technological options represents 
an uncertainty for investors and policy makers. 
Early selection might accelerate development, 
but risks locking in weak technologies.
2. Safe storage
There is uncertainty as to whether geological 
storage of CO2  will be secure over long time 
periods, as well as if and how the associated 
risks can be reliably assessed and managed.
3. Scaling up and speed of development and 
deployment
There is uncertainty about whether and how 
fast CCS technologies can be scaled up and 
developed to maturity. 
4. Integration of CCS systems
It is unclear how CCS systems will be integrated. 
Integration is a technical challenge, as well as an 
issue of organisation and governance.
5. Economic and financial viability
The future cost and financial risk of 
implementing CCS are very uncertain. The 
economic and financial uncertainty is heavily 
dependent on policy.
6. Policy, politics and regulation
CCS development is strongly influenced by 
uncertainties about extent of political support, 
as well as the choice and design of policies and 
regulations.
7. Public acceptance
Public acceptance may be crucial to CCS 
development, but is uncertain. Attitudes to CCS 
are shaped in social interaction.
- Number of technology variants
-  Relative importance of variants for technology developers
- Market share of technology variants
-  Extent of lock-in / dominance of particular technology 
variant
-  Availability of storage site data, including agreed robust 
estimates of their capacity
-  Nature of legal / regulatory framework to share risks / 
liabilities
- Levels of public awareness / acceptance of risks
- Unit size, capacity and efficiency
- Speed of unit scaling
- Cumulative investment / installed capacity
- Relative importance of market niches
- Whether full chain integration has been achieved?
- The allocation of responsibility for integration
-  Presence, role and importance of ‘system integrator’ firms/
actors
-  Nature of development, including roles of key actors and 
the relative importance of ‘bottom up’ / emergent and ‘top 
down’ / directed development
- Costs, including assessment of quality of cost data
- Key financial risks and ‘financeability’
-  Role of subsidies, other forms of economic / financial 
support, and other sources of finance (shared with 
uncertainty 6)
-  Nature of legal / regulatory framework to share risks / 
liabilities
-  Role of subsidies, other forms of economic / financial 
support, and other sources of finance (shared with 
uncertainty 5)
- Role of other forms of policy support
- Extent of political commitment / legitimacy
- Levels of public awareness / acceptance of risks 
- Specific manifestation of public opposition (or support)
- Quality of public engagement
Key uncertainties                     Indicators
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Faced with the inherent uncertainties 
about the future of a new technology,  
it is common to draw on our experience 
of previous technologies that are 
analogous in some way. This happens 
both informally in discussions as 
well as through formalised, explicit 
comparisons in the development of 
designs, policies and strategies.
Historical analogues  
for CCS
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Faced with the inherent uncertainties about the  
future of a new technology, it is common to draw  
on our experience of previous technologies that  
are analogous in some way. 
This happens both informally in discussions as well 
as through formalised, explicit comparisons in the 
development of designs, policies and strategies. For 
example Reiner and Herzog (2004) have explored 
regulatory analogues for CO2 storage. 
A few previous studies have sought to use historical 
analogues to assess the potential future development 
of CCS technologies. Studies of CCS learning rates have 
tried to quantify the rate of learning experienced by 
mature technologies such as flue gas desulphurisation 
(FGD). They use this evidence to argue that CCS might 
develop similarly, with costs falling as CCS technologies 
are progressively deployed (Rubin et al., 2004, Rubin et 
al., 2007). There is also some qualitative research that 
compares CCS with other technologies, which is useful 
for exploring a wider range of innovation processes 
than can be compressed into a learning rate. This report 
adds to this second tradition of qualitative research. In 
comparison with previous studies (e.g. Chalmers et al, 
2009; Rai et al, 2009), the report includes a more in-depth 
analysis of a wider range of analogue case studies. 
The historical analogues included in this study were 
chosen to be similar to CCS with respect to one of the 
seven uncertainties outlined in Section 2 of this report. 
It is important to note that any analogue is necessarily 
different in some ways and can only ever be a partial 
analogue. In fact, Giacomini (2005) stresses that the 
quality of an analogue lies not in being similar in as 
many ways as possible, but in being very similar in one 
aspect that is of interest. This means that learning from 
analogues is never perfect because the ‘fit’ is never 
perfect. Not only will there be technical differences, but 
important contextual factors may also differ significantly 
between the analogue and the policy, market and 
institutional environment for CCS in the UK. In this 
section of the paper, we explicitly draw attention to 
some of the limitations of the analogue case studies, 
particularly where they relate to a lesson that is being 
drawn for CCS.
The analogues were chosen to explore all the seven 
project uncertainties for CCS. To make sure that the 
analogues were well chosen, a long list was first drafted, 
drawing on existing literature, stakeholder interviews 
and the inter-disciplinary research team. The draft list 
was further developed through a stakeholder workshop 
which had attendees from industry, government and 
academia. The workshop also included a prioritisation 
process to help the team identify the most promising 
analogue cases, taking into account factors such as 
their relevance, coverage of the project uncertainties 
and research team resources. The analogues were also 
selected to cover the whole CCS chain from capture to 
transport and storage
The project team subsequently used the workshop 
outcomes to agree a final shortlist of nine analogue case 
studies, each of which covers a defined time period. The 
shortlist is shown in Table 3.1 alongside the uncertainties 
they relate to. The research for each case study was 
carried out using a combination of literature reviews 
and, in some cases, a few expert interviews to fill gaps in 
the published data and analysis. The case studies were 
written up using a standard template which includes 
sections on the context for the case, the case analysis 
with respect to the uncertainty concerned, interactions 
with other project uncertainties, and lessons from the 
case – both in general, and with respect to CCS.
In this section of the paper, we 
explicitly draw attention to some 
of the limitations of the analogue 
case studies, particularly where 
they relate to a lesson that is  
being drawn for CCS.
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Uncertainty Historical analogue case studies
1. Variety of pathways  The French Nuclear Programme, 1950s-1980s
2. Safe storage  The management of radioactive waste in the UK,  
 1956-2011
3. Scaling up and speed of development and deployment   The UK ‘Dash for Gas’, 1987-2000 
 Flue Gas Desulphurisation in the USA, 1960s-2009
4. Integration of CCS systems Natural Gas Network in the UK, 1960-2010
5. Economic and financial viability Flue Gas Desulphurisation in the USA, 1960s-1970s 
 Investments in landfill in the UK, 2001-2011
6. Policy, politics and regulation    Flue Gas Desulphurisation in the UK, 1980s to 2009
7. Public acceptance Natural gas infrastructure development in the UK,  
 2000-11
5 Full case study reports are available on the UKERC website – www.ukerc.ac.uk
Table 3.1: Analogue case studies
This section of the report presents brief results of each 
of the nine cases. For each uncertainty, the section 
summarises the case(s)5 that were carried out and their 
key features. It also sets out the lessons for CCS policies 
and strategies, together with any limitations of these 
lessons. 
Variety of pathways 
This uncertainty has been analysed with the help of a 
case study on the Development and deployment of nuclear 
power in France from the 1950s-1980s (Kern, 2011b). The 
French nuclear programme is widely seen as a successful 
example of a large scale, rapid roll-out of a standardised 
design (Grubler, 2010). In the 1950s, a variety of different 
reactor designs were available internationally (Cowan, 
1990). The case analysed the process by which this initial 
variety was reduced to one dominant design in France by 
the 1980s. 
This case is a partial analogue for the possible 
development of CCS as there is currently technological 
diversity for each of the components of the CCS chain. 
According to insights from the innovation studies 
literature, competition among technology variants is 
normal and beneficial for learning, but will most likely 
be reduced as technologies get nearer wide deployment. 
There is uncertainty as to what technologies will win out 
and when that will happen. For policy makers and other 
stakeholders, this uncertainty raises questions about 
when to support a diversity of designs and when to 
prioritise specific variants. 
There is uncertainty as to what 
technologies will win out and 
when that will happen. For policy 
makers and other stakeholders, 
this uncertainty raises questions 
about when to support a diversity 
of designs and when to prioritise 
specific variants. 
Initially, in France, a domestic design of gas-cooled 
graphite reactors (GCR) was developed, but subsequently 
the French opted for an American pressurised water 
reactor (PWR) design, which also became dominant 
globally (see Figure 3.1). Later, France also invested 
significant resources into the development of a fast 
breeder reactor (FBR), which was never commercialised. 
The history of the French nuclear programme illustrates 
that technological variety can be reduced by policy, 
albeit with significant risks if it is not possible to identify 
which variant is the ‘best’. A number of technical and 
political rather than economic factors played a key role 
in the process of choosing the ‘best’ design for the French 
nuclear roll-out. Thereafter, standardisation contributed 
to lower costs and shorter construction times compared 
to other countries.
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Lessons for CCS policies and strategies
The French nuclear programme illustrates both the 
advantages and drawbacks of selecting a specific design 
early on. The decision to pursue the gas-cooled design 
at the start of the programme and the subsequent 
support for the fast breeder reactor were not successful. 
Deployment was very limited, and the costs were 
substantial. By contrast, decisive government support 
for the roll-out of the Westinghouse PWR design in 
the 1960s led to standardisation, learning effects and 
cost advantages. Its subsequent ‘frenchifying’ led to 
the development of an independent nuclear industrial 
capability in France.
The history of nuclear power illustrates the risks 
involved in choosing a technology design in the 
absence of sufficient information about its costs and 
performance. Whilst the decision to choose the PWR paid 
off due to France’s substantial investment programme 
in the 1970s and 1980s, it is important to remember that 
light water reactors such as the PWR were considered 
at the time to be interim technologies. The expectation 
was that it would be succeeded by more advanced and 
cheaper technologies such as the fast breeder reactor – a 
technology that has since failed progress (Cowan, 1990).
The reason for the UK’s initial focus on post-combustion 
CCS on coal-fired power plants was partly due to 
industrial lobbying, and the possibility that it could 
be sold as a retrofit technology in international 
markets – especially China and India. It was also due to 
environmental NGO campaigns against unabated coal 
plants (Watson and Scrase, 2009). Many analysts think 
that pre-combustion technology is potentially more 
efficient, elegant and cheaper. But as with nuclear at the 
time of the French decision to adopt the PWR, there is 
a lack of empirical evidence on whether post- or pre-
combustion CCS will be more economically attractive 
(see Figure 1.1 in the introduction to this report for an 
illustration of this). It is therefore important that public 
policies recognise this uncertainty. Supporting just one 
variant of CCS, as the original UK CCS demonstration 
plant competition aimed to do, has high risks. 
In contrast to what might be expected with regard to 
CCS, nuclear power decision-making processes about 
which reactor design to pursue were not based on 
economic considerations. Rather these processes had 
strong political components due to the strategic status 
of nuclear power and close relations to the military use 
of nuclear technology, the wish to provide orders to 
French equipment firms, long lead times and fears of 
technological exposure (Thomas, 1988). CCS development 
and deployment is also being shaped by government 
policy in a major way because of its climate policy 
rationale and there would be limited commercial interest 
in CCS technologies in the absence of strong policy 
drivers (apart from enhanced oil recovery). At the same 
time, economic considerations remain important. There 
are clear limits on the amount of public funding available 
for CCS, and competition is favoured as a mechanism to 
identify the ‘best’ projects to support. 
The unique institutional set-up allowing centralised 
decision-making which enabled the roll-out of the French 
nuclear programme is considered to be one of its key 
success factors (Hadjilambrinos, 2000; Grubler, 2010). A 
repeat of this kind of governance arrangement, with a 
central role for a monopoly state-owned utility, is unlikely 
for CCS in the UK. The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) 
process is likely to mean a more co-ordinated approach 
to investment choices in the UK than has been the case 
since liberalisation started over 20 years ago. But it is 
clear that the UK government’s commitment to CCS 
has its limits. In the Carbon Plan 2011, the government 
states that its overall aim in the power sector is to ‘run 
a low carbon technology race between CCS, renewables 
and nuclear power’ (DECC, 2011d: 72). Therefore, whilst 
the EMR process will mean significant change, the 
UK’s electricity market context remains fundamentally 
different to the context for the French nuclear programme.
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It is clear that the UK  
government’s commitment to  
CCS has its limits. In the Carbon 
Plan 2011, the government states 
that its overall aim in the power 
sector is to ‘run a low carbon  
technology race between CCS,  
renewables and nuclear power.
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Safe storage
This uncertainty has been analysed with the help of 
one case study: The management of radioactive waste 
in the UK from 1956 to 2011 (Gross, 2011). Radioactive 
waste (RW) management is used as an analogue for the 
secure storage of carbon. In both cases, the indefinite 
management or disposal of waste poses long-term 
environmental risks. 
The case study focused on four aspects of RW 
management: site selection, operational and accident 
liability and public acceptance. The study found 
that two previous attempts at selecting sites for the 
geological disposal of RW foundered, while a third 
attempt is ongoing. The initial approaches were almost 
exclusively based on expert judgement of the technical 
feasibility with little public input and transparency and 
they faced substantial public opposition. The ongoing 
third attempt uses an approach suggested by the 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management where 
local communities volunteer to host the repository, 
and continued public engagement is seen as key in 
building trust in the selection process. Operational 
liability refers to the financial costs of RW management 
and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Liability 
arrangements changed over time as the nuclear industry 
changed from public to mainly private ownership. 
Whereas under public ownership no particular 
arrangements were made, segregated, external funds 
have been established under private ownership to cover 
the long-term liabilities (MacKerron, 2012). Arrangements 
for liabilities for nuclear accidents in the UK differ 
from those of traditional ‘tort liability’. Tort liability is 
based on fault, is unlimited and insurance is voluntary. 
Nuclear liability, in contrast, is strict and channelled to 
the operator. Liability insurance or financial security is 
mandatory and the overall liability of operators is capped 
(ie it is underwritten by government). Safety perceptions 
have a major impact on acceptance of nuclear energy. 
Many people feel poorly informed about RW and have 
little trust in government and the nuclear industry 
(Eurobarometer, 2008).
The history of nuclear power  
illustrates the risks involved in 
choosing a technology design  
in the absence of sufficient  
information about its costs and 
performance. 
Lessons for CCS policies and strategies
A number of implications for CCS can be identified 
from the historical experience with radioactive waste 
management. First, site selection methodologies should 
be carefully structured to ensure that financial concerns 
cannot compromise site safety. Any additional expense 
associated with exploiting safer sites must be balanced 
against the potentially greater costs of subsequent leaks 
and the loss of a licence to operate the site, as well as 
the damage to public confidence in CCS such leaks 
might cause. Site selection needs to be a transparent and 
open process with stakeholder input in order to boost 
public trust. Second, the case suggests that engaging 
the public in a dialogue over carbon storage through 
an organisation which is independent of the CCS 
industry and government could reap benefits in terms 
of increasing public acceptance of CCS and confidence 
in safe carbon storage. This may also help to ensure 
that ‘procedural justice’ is followed – ie that there is 
confidence in decision making processes about carbon 
storage in general, as well as particular storage sites 
(McLaren, 2011). The experience of the Committee on 
Radioactive Waste Management suggests that location 
specific engagement processes may also be required 
(CoRWM, 2006).
Third, the nuclear experience suggests that strict, capped 
and channelled liability for carbon storage operators 
will afford advantages over tort liability. It can facilitate 
swifter resolution of compensation claims. However, it 
is important to bear in mind that restrictions on nuclear 
liabilities faced by electric utilities are underwritten by 
governments. By contrast, an unlimited, open-ended 
liability is likely to deter private investment in CCS 
plants. However, implementing a cap on liabilities that 
is too low could expose taxpayers to too much risk – and 
site operators to too little risk. Not channelling liability to 
the storage operator could also lead to ‘double-insurance’ 
by suppliers and therefore increase overall costs. 
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An important limitation of this case is that most 
studies of the potential for carbon storage in the UK 
point to the exploitation of offshore sites (DEFRA, 
2008; Gough & Shackley, 2005). This contrasts with the 
disposal of RW, where - since the London Dumping 
Convention permanently outlawed RW dumping 
at sea in 1994 - the principal focus for a repository 
has been onshore. Therefore, the current process for 
siting a deep underground repository, in which local 
communities volunteer to host the facility, presents no 
direct lessons for carbon storage projects. However, it 
can still be argued that when specific CCS projects are 
at the planning stage, a broad public dialogue about the 
storage options (eg saline aquifers; oil and gas fields) 
and possible locations should take place in order to gain 
public confidence.
The nature of the waste product itself is different in 
the case of carbon storage. In one respect, CO2  is less 
immediately dangerous than nuclear waste which 
might help public acceptance of safe storage. CO2 is 
directly toxic only at concentrations of 100,000 parts per 
million (ie 10%). However, the long-term storage of CO2 
is undertaken specifically to reduce concentrations of 
atmospheric greenhouse gases. Thus, while the storage 
of carbon and the disposal of RW both involve financial 
risks, the leakage of carbon will pose an additional 
climate risk. Therefore the considerations applicable  
to RW management and CO2 storage are different. 
Liability provisions for CCS plants will need to take site 
specific issues into account such as potential leakage and 
injection rates, and the range of possible carbon prices 
that could be used to value the impact of any  
CO2 that is emitted.
Scaling up and speed of development  
and deployment
This uncertainty was explored with the help of two case 
studies: The development and rapid deployment of combined 
cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants in the UK from 1987 
to 2000 (Kern, 2011a); and the development and deployment 
of flue gas desulphurisation technology (FGD) in power plants 
in the US between the 1960s and 2009 (Markusson, 2011a). 
Both technologies have been substantially scaled up in 
terms of the size of individual units and they have also 
been rolled out at a substantial magnitude.
The analysis of the combined cycle gas turbine case 
showed the long time frame involved in scaling up the 
technology to a size of relevance for the power sector. 
The development from the first industrial CCGT plants 
to a competitive power sector technology in the 1990s 
took about 30 years. It required long-term, sustained 
R&D investment by the heavy equipment manufacturers 
(General Electric, Westinghouse, Siemens and ABB). Sales 
The nature of the waste 
product itself is different in the 
case of carbon storage. In one 
respect, CO2 is less immediately 
dangerous than nuclear waste 
which might help public 
acceptance of safe storage.
in niche markets enabled re-investment of revenues in 
R&D. The technological development also profited from 
substantial and prolonged public R&D investment in the 
development of jet engines. The analysis showed how a 
variety of factors contributed to the surge of deployment 
of the technology in the 1990s which was previously 
not expected to play a large role in the electricity sector 
in the UK. The rapid roll-out is explained by changes 
in economic conditions (eg the availability of cheap 
gas), policy and regulatory factors (eg lifting of the ban 
on using natural gas for power generation; stronger 
environmental regulations; introduction of competition 
in the electricity sector) and technological developments 
(efficiency improvements and scaling up). Competition 
between the manufacturers led to downward pressure on 
costs which also helped drive the ‘dash for gas’.
The analysis of FGD in the US showed that the technology 
went through a period of relatively rapid scaling up and 
development in the 1970s, and has later exhibited bursts 
of rapid investment activity and wide roll-out. FGD 
systems went through a fivefold scale up over a period 
of 30 years. A modular approach facilitated the relatively 
rapid early scaling of the overall FGD plants of 2.5 times 
over 5 years – and even faster for some technology 
variants, with scrubber unit sizes increasing more slowly. 
Deployment was driven by a range of different policy 
approaches over time, including emissions performance 
standards, (implicit) technology mandates and sulphur 
emissions trading. After the initial series of investments 
in the 1970s, a markedly uneven rate of build can be 
observed in the 1980s onwards, with peaks of several 
10s of GWs installed in some years. At times, this caused 
worries about the ability of industry to scale up its 
capacity quickly enough. Part of the reason why this has 
worked is the international nature of the FGD equipment 
market that has smoothed out overall demand. Towards 
the end of the period studied, there were however 
signs of FGD ‘booms’ in several markets coinciding in 
time, with renewed worries about industry capacity 
bottlenecks forming.
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Lessons for CCS policies and strategies
In terms of overall lessons from the two cases about 
scaling up and rolling out a technology, several points 
seem important. First, scaling up gas turbines to the 
size required for a CCGT plant (from 5MW to about 
200MW) took about 30 years; FGD systems also went 
through a 30 year period of scaling up of the maximum 
scrubber size (by a factor 5). The modular nature of both 
technologies required some scaling up for the use in 
power generation, but not unit scaling up to the size of 
a full power plant. Governments played an important 
role in this process – for example through R&D support 
for the development of military jet engines (a source of 
technologies for CCGTs), and through US government 
networking and R&D support for the FGD industry. In 
both cases the rapidity of scaling up processes led to 
significant reliability and efficiency problems which 
slowed down development and deployment, and were 
also expensive to rectify.
In terms of the speed of roll-out, the CCGT case showed 
that during the ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s an average of 
2.1GW per year of new capacity was installed in the UK. 
This can be contrasted with government and industry 
expectations for CCS deployment in the UK to 2030. 
The Carbon Capture and Storage Association has called 
for 20-30GW of CCS capacity by 2030, whilst a recent 
government statement includes a figure of 10GW for 2030 
(Hendry, 2012). For FGD in the US, build rates were higher, 
albeit in a much larger market. The US power system 
is approximately ten times bigger than that of the UK. 
Within a decade of the first large-scale FGD system being 
retrofitted onto a power plant in 1968, 5GW FGD capacity 
was added in the US annually. Later, rates of up to 30 GW 
were reached, but only for short periods.
As with scaling up, this process of rolling out was driven 
partly by government policies. For example the UK 
roll out of CCGTs was facilitated by electricity market 
liberalisation and, subsequently, by strengthened 
environmental regulations. The US government played 
a key role in facilitating technology development and 
deployment of FGD by imposing challenging regulatory 
standards on sulphur emissions from power plants. 
The FGD case illustrates how a range of different policy 
approaches were used at different times. Emissions 
performance standards, mandates and emissions trading 
have been used, sometimes in combination, to drive 
deployment.
There is a similarity to the package of financial and 
other measures that are currently envisaged by the UK 
government to support CCS technologies. Furthermore, 
the development and deployment of FGD technologies 
in the United States was motivated by similar concerns, 
ie the need for policy action to deal with environmental 
pollution. However, in the FGD case, policy makers and 
regulators had more leverage because of the market 
structure in place at the time. Electricity was provided 
by private and public monopoly utilities. With the 
consent of regulators, the additional costs of pollution 
control technologies like FGD could be passed on to their 
customers. The UK ‘dash for gas’ is different since it did 
not occur due to planned policy action. Instead, it was 
an outcome of a variety of factors which included policy 
developments – though none of these policies were 
specifically designed to promote the adoption of this 
particular technology (Watson, 1997). 
A final lesson from these cases is that CCGT deployment 
in the UK profited from experiences elsewhere (mainly 
in the US) while FGD deployment in the US also drew 
on earlier experience with wet limestone scrubbing in 
the UK, Japan and elsewhere. In both cases technology 
transfer from other applications/sectors played a major 
role in technology development (from jet engines in the 
case of gas turbines and other chemical plants in the 
case of FGD absorbers). This latter point has important 
implications for CCS technologies. Whilst some 
components of CCS systems (particularly capture plants) 
have only been deployed at ‘pilot’ scales so far, some of 
these components are in use at larger scales in other 
applications (Chalmers, 2012). Therefore, in addition 
to some scaling up, there is potential for technology 
transfer from these other applications – though this 
will come with significant challenges of technological 
adaptation and integration into CCS systems. 
Integration of CCS systems
This uncertainty was explored with the help of one 
case study: The transition of the system for gas provision 
in the UK from town gas to natural gas from 1960 to 2010. 
The study was chosen as an analogue for the challenges 
of integrating large, infrastructural technical systems 
(Arapostathis, 2011). From 1960 to the mid-1980s, the 
gas infrastructure was under nationalised governance 
with the Gas Council as the dominant actor. The 
introduction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from 1964 
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facilitated the later conversion from town gas to natural 
gas, by providing a ‘back bone’ pipeline up the middle 
of England. The introduction of LNG created several 
challenges, including the higher pressure needed for 
natural gas, the conversion of burners in domestic 
appliances and the need for new expertise. The 
introduction of North Sea gas from the late 1960s drove 
a change process, in which resilience and flexibility were 
sought, and provided by interconnections, storage and 
new control technologies.
The period from the mid-1980s brought privatisation 
and market liberalisation, and a multitude of actors 
contributing to the development of the system. From the 
late 1990s, the depletion of North Sea resources led to a 
renewed emphasis on gas imports – and a simultaneous 
rise in political debate about the security of UK gas 
supplies. The need to expand imports led to large-scale 
investments in new pipeline interconnectors and LNG 
import terminals. 
Lessons for CCS policies and strategies
One important lesson from the early period covered by 
the case is that the development of the national gas grid 
pre-dated the switch to natural gas. The introduction 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilitated the later 
development of the natural gas network by providing 
a driver for the construction of the ‘back bone’ of this 
network. With respect to CCS, this suggests that the 
first UK demonstration projects could be an opportunity 
to develop a new CO2 pipeline network. Unlike natural 
gas, however, CO2 networks for CCS do not have to be 
integrated nationally, and will not extend to millions  
of final consumers.
It is more likely that regionally integrated pipeline 
systems will be developed for CCS. CO2 pipeline networks 
for CCS could therefore have more in common with 
the offshore networks of gas and oil that transmit fuel 
to the shore. In the case of natural gas infrastructure, 
network design was adjusted as exploration of new 
fields developed. Thus engineers and network designers 
promoted flexibility in the network design. Similarly, 
CO2 pipeline networks will need to be developed flexibly 
since it is not yet clear which power plants will fit CCS 
first, and the order in which storage sites will be brought 
online.  In addition to this, there may also be benefits 
from international interconnection of CO2 networks  
to increase system flexibility and economies of scale. 
This would be similar to the increasing interconnection 
of UK gas networks with those in other countries in 
recent years.  
Another lesson from this case is that system integration 
is more than just a technical issue. There are also social 
and organisational dimensions to system integration. 
In the gas grid development case, the switch from town 
gas to natural gas required the development of new 
skills, large-scale training programmes, and required 
changes to equipment in people’s homes. Management 
of the multiple types of expertise necessary for the 
establishment of CCS projects (including capture plants, 
pipeline networks and storage facilities) will also be 
challenging – as will the development of contractual 
arrangements to enable costs, risks and revenues to be 
shared in a way that suits all parties.  One of the lessons 
learned from the recent negotiations to establish a full 
scale CCS demonstration at Longannet is that integrating 
the different areas of expertise within CCS projects is 
likely to require significant resources (Scottish Power CCS 
Consortium, 2011b).
An important limitation of this case is that the natural 
gas industry and network were developed in a period 
of nationalisation and centralised control - politically 
and organisationally. The natural gas infrastructure was 
already well developed before the more recent period 
of privatisation and liberalisation, though considerable 
additional infrastructure development has occurred in 
the liberalised era. It remains an open question whether 
CCS will be deployed within a liberalised market context 
like the current one. Electricity Market Reforms could 
mean a significant shift to a less liberalised policy and 
market context, which could have a significant impact on 
CCS infrastructure development.
Economic and financial viability
We chose two cases to shed light on economic and 
financial uncertainties: the storage in landfill sites of waste 
in the UK from 2001 to 2011 (Kern, 2011c); and flue gas 
desulphurisation in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Markusson, 2011c). 
Landfilling of waste is considered as a suitable regulatory 
analogue to carbon storage because both activities 
raise questions about the long-term environmental 
risks and associated liabilities of dealing with waste 
streams. Landfilling also has a number of operational 
characteristics which make it similar to carbon storage 
(for example a long aftercare phase after operations have 
stopped). The EU CCS directive was directly modelled 
on the EU landfill directive (for example, in relation to 
the rules on financial provisions). Whilst landfill was 
previously the cheapest waste management solution, 
it has come under intense regulatory pressure during 
the last decade because of limits imposed by the EU 
landfill directive.  There have been no investments in 
new landfill sites since the directive was implemented 
in 2001. The UK government therefore introduced a 
number of instruments to reduce the amount of waste 
being sent to landfill. New void space, where necessary, 
has been created through an extension of existing sites. 
The financial provisions for monitoring and aftercare are 
not perceived as an important obstacle to investment in 
site extensions by operators. However, they do impact on 
operators’ ability to finance projects and their balance 
sheets, especially when they operate multiple sites. 
The focus of the case was widened to include other 
investments in waste management infrastructure such 
as recycling and energy-from-waste plants. Key risks 
influencing the economic and financial viability of such 
investments include: off-take, waste stream, technology, 
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policy and planning risk. It is argued that carbon storage 
faces similar risks.
The case study of flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) technology 
in the United States covers the mid-1960s to the late 1970s; 
the period when the technology began receiving serious 
attention and investment. The first large-scale FGD plant 
was built in the late 1960s. Regulators introduced an 
emissions performance standard in 1971, which created 
demand for FGD. The government also supported the 
technology through funding R&D, establishing test 
centres and sharing data. Litigation created policy 
uncertainty and delayed investments, but ultimately the 
standard stood up against the challenges. Subsequent 
regulation enacted in 1979 was more stringent and 
effectively mandated FGD. FGD costs rose five-fold in the 
period studied, and they subsequently fell substantially 
in the 1980s (see Figure 3.2). The increases were due to 
unforeseen technical problems and the challenges of 
technology transfer from other sectors. This rise in costs 
was much bigger than predicted at the time when the 
first large plant came on line. Financial risk was not a key 
problem for the investing utilities, since they operated in 
regulated, regional monopoly markets and were allowed 
to pass on abatement costs to their customers.
It is important to recognise that these two cases are 
different, and they can therefore offer different kinds of 
lessons for CCS. The landfill case includes lessons about 
the specifics of policy design under a market-oriented 
regime, about (some forms of) long-term liabilities, and 
focuses on a mature technology. By contrast, the FGD 
case provides lessons about costs and cost data in early 
stages of technology development, and about what could 
be done in a regulated monopoly policy regime where 
financial uncertainty works very differently.
The landfill case shows that financial arrangements 
are key to the coordination of the wide range of actors 
involved in infrastructure technologies. The financial 
provisions for monitoring and aftercare are not perceived 
as an obstacle for new investment. The most common 
mechanism for meeting provisions is through bonds. 
Whilst this experience is relevant to CCS, carbon storage 
site closure and aftercare monitoring might well incur 
substantially higher costs than landfill sites, and higher 
bond premiums.
However, it is important that the liabilities covered by 
such a bond only cover the costs of site closure and post-
closure monitoring in case the operator goes bankrupt 
before fulfilling the requirements of the environmental 
permit. Accidental leakage of stored carbon leads to 
different kinds of liabilities such as the costs of offsetting 
the emissions released from the storage site, which 
might be linked to the price of carbon within the EU ETS. 
These liabilities might need to be covered by some kind 
of insurance product (EC 2008: 42). For this kind of risk, 
landfill regulation does not offer a suitable analogue. In 
this context, the regulatory framework for dealing with 
nuclear waste might offer some insights (Gross, 2011). 
The government has used a variety of instruments 
to incentivise investment in new waste management 
infrastructure including long-term contracts, private 
finance initiative credits and grants. Similar instruments 
are planned to support CCS investment – including 
capital subsidies and long-term contracts under 
Electricity Market Reform. The provision of long-term 
contracts (with a fixed price) is likely to be important in 
enabling CO2 infrastructure investments to overcome key 
risks, including those relating to policy.
The FGD case shows that ‘technology forcing’ through 
the use of regulations can stimulate technology 
development and early deployment. For CCS, forcing 
could conceivably be done through different policy 
instruments, such as an emissions performance 
standard (EPS) or a mandate. The viability of technology 
forcing depends on whether companies can pass on the 
costs, the availability of alternative investments, and on 
the precise design of the policy instrument. There are 
a number of reasons why such a regulatory approach 
may not be appropriate for CCS in the UK – at least 
not at the present time. These reasons stem from the 
very different institutional and market context for FGD 
investment during the period studied. Most US utilities 
were regulated monopolies which could pass on costs for 
sulphur abatement to final consumers. FGD technologies 
were significantly more mature at that time than CCS 
is today, with the first few full-scale plants already in 
operation. Potential investors in FGD had comparatively 
few other options to comply with sulphur regulations – 
though they could invest in less effective options such as 
coal cleaning and switching to lower sulphur coals. 
3.2 Capital costs of FGD plants in the United States
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Finally, the costs of FGD equipment were a smaller share 
of overall power plant costs than CCS equipment is 
expected to be. In view of these differences, regulations 
to ‘force’ CCS investment are likely to be less effective 
than the US approach to FGD – at least until there is more 
experience of full-scale CCS plant operation and costs.
It is difficult to predict the costs of a technology before 
full-scale deployment. Even after the first large-
scale plant was operating, FGD cost estimates were 
characterised by ‘appraisal optimism’. They turned 
out to be much too low. The experience of FGD and of 
low-carbon technologies such as offshore wind (Gross, 
Greenacre et al., 2010) suggests that significant increases 
in CCS costs could occur during the demonstration and 
early deployment phases. CCS technologies are not yet 
on a ‘learning curve’ in which costs will inevitably fall 
with increasing deployment. The FGD experience also 
shows that costs may subsequently fall once ‘teething 
problems’ have been sorted out and experience grows.
Policy, politics and regulation
This uncertainty has been explored through a case 
study of FGD technology deployment at power plants in 
the UK between the early 1980s and 2009 (Markusson, 
2011b). This analogue was selected because FGD 
deployment is dependent on policy and regulation, and 
policies to support FGD in the UK have been subject 
to significant uncertainty and controversy. During the 
1980s international concerns about acid rain began 
to seriously drive policy discussions about sulphur 
emissions abatement in the UK. The EU adopted the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) in 1988, 
which included limits on these emissions. The LCPD 
has had significant impacts on FGD investment in 
the UK, but this has also been a politicised process. 
Whilst the EU promoted emissions reductions and the 
use of FGD, the UK government and industry resisted 
abatement investments that were considered too 
costly. Therefore, FGD investments were made but were 
delayed. More recent EU regulations which mandate 
closure of unabated fossil fuel plants by 2015, together 
with financial incentives under the second phase of 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, have stimulated a 
rapid increase in investment. By 2008, power sector SO2 
6 Thanks to Tony White of BW Energy for providing us with some detail on this point.
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emissions had been reduced by 94% compared to 1980 
levels as a result of fuel switching (from coal to gas), the 
use of lower sulphur coals, and the introduction of FGD. 
FGD contributed between a quarter and a third of these 
emissions reductions. The overall UK FGD investment 
programme cost £1.4-1.8bn in 2011 prices.
Lessons for CCS policies and strategies
An important lesson from this case is that policies to 
support the reduction of emissions, and the deployment 
of technologies to achieve this, can be highly contentious 
and political. The government and the major energy 
companies (particularly the nationalised utility) were 
reluctant to invest in FGD technology to help reduce 
sulphur emissions in the 1980s because of the expected 
high cost of the technology. The attitude of the UK 
government and firms to CCS technologies is markedly 
different. In contrast to the situation for acid rain in the 
1980s, recent UK governments have played a leading 
international role in advocating emissions abatement 
– and energy companies are actively pressing for 
public policy incentives to enable investment in CCS 
technologies (eg CCSA, 2011). However, the costs of CCS 
technologies have been an important area of debate: not 
least in the negotiations for the first UK demonstration 
plant. The developers of the failed Longannet 
demonstration project concluded that their plant would 
cost £1.2-£1.5bn whereas only £1bn of public funding 
was available (Scottish Power CCS Consortium, 2011a). 
The costs of low-carbon technologies have also become a 
more prominent area of political debate due to concerns 
about the impact on household bills (CCC, 2011b).
A second lesson is that the choice of policy instruments 
may have an impact on the success of efforts to support 
CCS demonstration and deployment. In the case of FGD, 
a range of instruments were used at different times 
including emissions limits and financial incentives (most 
recently, from the EU emissions trading scheme). For 
CCS, a similar blend of policy instruments is likely to be 
used – albeit in a more liberalised market context. These 
include a general emissions performance standard and 
long term contracts as part of Electricity Market Reform, 
and capital grants. Whilst emissions limits led to limited 
FGD deployment in the 1990s, the implementation of 
tough regulations on fossil fuel plants under the latest 
EU Directives covering combustion plant has been far 
more effective in incentivising widespread deployment. 
In the intervening period, the costs of installing FGD fell 
considerably which made it much easier for regulations 
to have the desired effect. The original UK investments 
in FGD in the 1990s now look expensive, though there 
were significant differences between the first plant at 
Drax and the second at Ratciffe. Drax was designed by 
the state-owned Central Electricity Generating Board 
before privatisation, whilst Ratcliffe was contracted by 
competitive tender using a performance based contract - 
and was therefore cheaper6.
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The lesson for CCS is that a regulatory approach alone 
is unlikely to be effective due to the higher expected 
costs of CCS technologies, and the larger energy penalty 
of operating capture equipment. As noted in section 1 
of this report, the additional direct costs of CCS were 
recently estimated by Mott MacDonald to be £335-900/
kW. By comparison, the costs of FGD plants in the UK 
have usually been less than £100/kW (Markusson, 2011b). 
In addition, uncertainties about CCS costs are greater 
because of a lack of full scale plants in operation. 
A third lesson is that policy flexibility can have 
contradictory impacts on technology deployment. It is 
useful to distinguish between flexibility in policy making 
and flexibility in industry compliance with a clear policy 
goal. Flexibility in policy making can cause a lot of 
uncertainty. In the UK FGD case, it led to the ‘capture’ 
of the policy process by industrial lobbies opposed to 
action in the early years. Flexibility in compliance can 
It is important for government to 
analyse the potentially complex 
impacts of policies to promote  
CCS. In the CCS case, this  
complexity is compounded by  
an ongoing process of Electricity 
Market Reform which represents  
a significant shift away from a  
liberalised market structure and 
towards a more co-ordinated set  
of institutional arrangements.
help to reduce costs by allowing industry some leeway 
in their investment and operational plans. At the time of 
writing, CCS is subject to both of these varieties of policy 
flexibility. It is not yet clear when (or if) the technology 
will be mandatory for new gas plants, or for existing coal 
and gas plants. Furthermore, the details of the revised 
CCS demonstration programme are still being developed. 
The FGD case shows that whilst such flexibility persists, 
technology deployment will be slowed down.
Finally, it is important for government to analyse the 
potentially complex impacts of policies to promote CCS. 
In the CCS case, this complexity is compounded by an 
ongoing process of Electricity Market Reform which 
represents a significant shift away from a liberalised 
market structure and towards a more co-ordinated 
set of institutional arrangements. As was the case for 
FGD in the USA, it is important for government to have 
substantial independent capabilities in the analysis of 
potential policy impacts and about technology costs 
and performance. This is especially the case when 
government is engaged in complex policy reforms, and is 
involved in difficult negotiations with developers about 
public funding or the precise design of policy incentives. 
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Public acceptance
This uncertainty was explored with the help of a 
case study on the public acceptance of the development 
of natural gas infrastructures in the UK between 2000 and 
2011 (Marsden and Markusson, 2011). This case was 
selected because natural gas infrastructure development 
is similar to the transport infrastructure needed for 
CCS, particularly pipelines and compressor stations. 
The study includes the use of salt and brine fields for 
underground gas storage (UGS), the development of 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals with above-ground 
storage tanks and the construction of pipelines (and 
pressure reduction installations) to connect new facilities 
with the national gas transmission system. The case is 
also relevant because recent investments in onshore gas 
pipeline and storage infrastructure in the UK have been 
accompanied by local protests and opposition, with some 
material impacts on project outcomes. 
 
Lessons for CCS policies and strategies
An important lesson from this case is that infrastructure 
projects such as gas pipelines can change the way that 
residents identify with their locale and how they feel 
about the landscape within which they live. For example, 
if there is a perception that new infrastructures lead to 
new safety risks, a place that was previously felt to be 
safe could come to be seen as unsafe. Public protests 
against such infrastructures may be more likely if the 
technologies involved are new and unfamiliar. Carbon 
capture and storage pipelines will be novel for most of 
the locations in which they are built. However, unlike 
natural gas, CO2 is neither flammable nor explosive – 
and these properties might make such pipelines more 
acceptable than those for natural gas. The lessons of 
the case with respect to gas storage facilities may be 
less relevant to CCS since any CO2 storage sites that 
are developed in the UK are expected to be offshore. 
It is important to note that there is a growing body of 
literature on public perceptions of CCS. For example, 
a recent pan-European survey (Reiner, Riesch et al., 
2011) shows that members of the public often raise 
concerns about the risks of CO2 storage – and that 
their perceptions of CCS technologies depend on a 
range of factors including their proximity to potential 
infrastructure.
The natural gas case study shows that infrastructure 
developers become visible to the public at two points: 
the planning stage and the construction stage. The 
planning stage involves public consultation, but tends to 
be less visible to the public due to the nature of planning 
processes, especially if it is large enough to be handled 
via national (rather than local) planning processes. Of 
course, protests at this stage can and do happen. By 
contrast, the construction stage is physically visible and 
can also produce protest, but then with far less scope for 
the public to prevent or change the development.
There have been public protests in many of the 
natural gas pipeline and storage projects we studied. 
Protests have been particularly visible at underground 
gas storage projects. The case has also shown that a 
series of development projects in the same area often 
lead to sustained opposition. This may be a relevant 
issue for CCS if a cluster of plants is developed in 
a particular area. Whilst these protests have led 
to some substantive delays and a small number 
of project cancellations, most gas infrastructure 
projects have not been significantly affected.
Despite the differences between natural gas and CO2, 
the research on public perceptions of CCS suggests 
that such protests could also affect pipelines and other 
infrastructure for CCS projects. If they do, delays, costs 
increases and even cancellations are all possible. The 
case also shows that it would be unwise to ignore early 
reactions from small opposition groups. Furthermore, a 
wide range of local, national and international factors 
will shape public reactions – so each site needs to be 
considered on a case by case basis. Areas with low 
population densities may be affected by less opposition 
to CCS infrastructure, but clearly the extent of opposition 
will also depend on whether these areas are seen as 
important or sensitive for other reasons. 
 
Interactions between uncertainties: virtuous 
cycles, vicious cycles and trade offs
Many of these uncertainties will interact with each 
other over time. Once the uncertainties had been 
chosen, a number of these potential interactions were 
identified (Markusson, Kern et al., 2012). This analysis 
was subsequently refined as a result of the analogue case 
studies. The final pattern of interactions is summarised 
in Figure 3.3.
One example has been highlighted in the Figure to 
illustrate what we mean by interactions. This shows an 
interaction between the ‘scaling and speed of roll-out’ 
of particular technologies and the ‘variety of pathways’ 
available. As the literature review showed, there is a risk 
that the rapid scaling up of a technology risks locking 
investors and the governments who support them into 
an inferior technology by reducing variety too early 
in the process. Conversely, keeping options open for 
too long by supporting a range of different technology 
variants risks spreading the resources too thinly. The 
case of the ‘dash for gas’ in the UK showed that the 
existence of a variety of turbine designs for an extended 
period of time enabled experimentation and learning. 
Furthermore, cross-fertilisation with more advanced 
jet engine technologies enabled the subsequent up 
scaling and efficiency improvements achieved in power 
generation gas turbines. The existence of niche markets 
for different designs sustained variety in this case, 
and reduced the risks of early lock-in. There was not a 
deliberate policy push to select one type of gas turbine 
(and CCGT) design over another. By contrast, the French 
nuclear case shows how policy did play such a role – and 
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made a clear decision in the face of uncertainty to back 
the PWR design in the 1960s.
Explaining all of the interactions included in Figure 3.3 is 
beyond the scope of this report. Instead, the remainder 
of this section of the report focuses in more detail on 
the interactions between the policy and economic 
uncertainties and the other uncertainties identified 
in the project. These interactions are summarised in 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. The policy uncertainty 
was chosen as a particular focus because of the central 
importance of policy in supporting the demonstration 
and deployment of CCS technologies. Indeed, in the 
absence of such policy support, it is very unlikely that 
these technologies would develop significantly at all. 
The economic and financial uncertainty was chosen 
because of the focus of our project on the conditions for 
CCS technologies to be ‘financeable’ in the UK. Whilst 
policy support is clearly required for CCS technologies 
to be deployed, the UK’s efforts to date illustrate the 
difficulties of designing policy mechanisms that provide 
enough certainty to investors.
The following discussion will provide examples from the 
case studies which highlight the interactions between 
the policy, politics and regulatory uncertainty and the 
other uncertainties. These interactions are denoted as 
P1-P6 in Figure 3.4. 
In terms of the linkage between policy and public 
acceptance (P1), the literature review for the public 
acceptance and UK natural gas infrastructure 
development case highlighted that the absence of 
credible regulatory regimes can decrease public 
confidence, and can provoke opposition. A strong 
regulatory regime might give stakeholders confidence 
and increase public support. Public acceptance is likely 
to be necessary for political support, and impacts on 
policy and regulatory decisions.
The case studies also identified an important linkage 
between the policy and variety of pathways uncertainties 
(P2). The French nuclear programme case highlighted the 
importance of this. In the French case (but also in the 
other countries developing civil nuclear power including 
Britain, the US and Germany), governments have 
played a strong role in supporting the development of 
nuclear power technologies and in reducing the variety 
of possible reactor designs. Sometimes political and 
military concerns, rather than economic or technological 
criteria have informed these choices. With respect to 
CCS, political decisions about whether or not to include 
coal and gas and which technologies to include in the UK 
government’s CCS demonstration competition can also 
shape technological variety.
The analysis has also identified an interaction between 
policy, politics and regulation and the uncertainty 
around safe storage (P3). The case study of radioactive 
waste management has stressed the importance 
of operational as well as accident liability regimes 
for the development of storage facilities for nuclear 
waste. In particular these rules shape the risk profile 
of investments and also impact on public acceptance 
of storage. The case study also stressed that policy 
decisions about appropriate site selection methodologies 
should not prioritise cost factors over safety concerns as 
any additional expense associated with exploring safer 
sites must be balanced against the potential costs of 
leaks and loss of public and investor confidence.
Policy decisions can also impact on uncertainties around 
the scaling and speed of roll-out of a technology (P4). 
In the case of FGD development in the US, regulation 
3.3 Linkages identified between the 
seven project uncertainties
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and policy decisions clearly influenced technology 
development and drove deployment. This is widely 
known as ‘technology forcing’ through regulation or 
standards. In contrast, the UK FGD case showed how 
politics between the UK and the EU led to delays in the 
roll out of FGD technology as UK policy makers were 
reluctant to impose regulations that would require costly 
compliance. What is perhaps more surprising is that 
regulation also shaped the scaling process, in terms of 
the choice between modular and ‘full-scale’ scrubber 
units in the US case. Instead of scaling up FGD units to 
the full-scale power plant size, modular designs were 
deployed. This was in part a response to engineering 
challenges related to the scaling up of the technology, 
but also a consequence of regulatory requirements. 
The US Environment Protection Agency only allowed 
an FGD absorber to be bypassed for the purpose of 
maintenance if there was a spare absorber to replace it. 
This means that FGD units were built as sets of modules 
which included one more module than was needed to 
operate the plant: for example, 3x50% capacity or 4x33% 
(Shattuck et al., 2007). 
The case study on the integration of the natural gas 
network in the UK (1960-2010) pointed to the importance 
of policy, politics and regulation for system integration 
(P5). The case study found that network integration in all 
periods of natural gas development was determined by 
the political regime, the policy decisions and the relevant 
regulations and regulatory cultures. The focus on the 
nationalisation of crucial industrial sectors resulted not 
only in a nationalised gas industry but also in a centrally 
controlled industry in which the governance of people 
and technologies were managed by one institution, 
the Gas Council. The privatisation and liberalisation 
introduced since the mid-1980s transformed the 
structure of the industry and changed the terms of 
network development. For CCS, the regulatory regime 
(especially liability rules) will clearly have implications 
for the technical and organisational forms of system 
integration that take place.
There is also a clear linkage between policy and 
economic and financial viability of CCS (P 6). As the 
literature review indicated, a variety of political, policy 
and regulatory decisions – for example about policy 
support mechanisms for CCS, carbon prices, carbon 
reduction goals, and liability rules - will have a large 
impact on the economic and financial viability of CCS. 
The case study of economic and financial viability of FGD 
in the US stressed the importance of policy decisions. 
For policy-driven, public good technologies like FGD and 
CCS, policy and regulatory uncertainty will always be of 
key importance for investment decisions. The policies 
and regulations introduced under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
were crucial to making the FGD a credible investment 
option, and for creating demand for this technology. The 
legal challenges against the CAA regulations created 
uncertainty that delayed investment in the early to mid 
1970s, showing the importance of policy and regulatory 
risk. Public support for R&D, knowledge diffusion, pilot 
scale tests and investments played a role, although most 
of the finance for large scale investments was covered 
by industry themselves. It was regulation rather than 
subsidies that mattered for ‘financeability’ in this case. 
The case study of the economic and financial viability of 
landfill in the UK emphasised the importance of policy 
and regulatory decisions that were taken due to pressure 
from the EU landfill directive. 
Now, we will turn to the interactions between economic 
and financial viability and the other uncertainties as 
outlined in Figure 3.5. Note that the linkage between 
economics and finance and policy uncertainties (denoted 
as E1) has already been covered above (as P6). 
3.5 Interactions with economics 
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The literature review and the case studies identified 
an important interaction between economics and 
finance and public acceptance (E2). The case study of 
the integration of the natural gas network in the UK 
(1960-2010) shows that this interaction works both ways. 
While economic factors (eg the cost of a technology 
passed through to consumers via electricity bills) can 
have an influence on public acceptance, the lack of public 
acceptance (eg protests) can impact on the economic 
and financial viability of a technology. However, in 
the case of FGD development in the USA, we did not 
find any evidence to suggest that consumers actively 
protested against increased costs of electricity due to 
FGD investment. We therefore conclude that higher 
costs could lead to a decrease in public acceptance of 
CCS, but that this is by no means an automatic response. 
Such a response may be more likely in the current 
UK political climate, in which there is a fierce debate 
about the legitimacy of meeting the incremental costs 
of low-carbon technologies via increases in consumer 
bills. The case study of the development of natural gas 
infrastructure in the UK between 2000 and 2011 showed 
that protest against developments can delay projects 
and thereby lead to higher costs than anticipated. The 
case study into the economic and financial viability of 
investments in landfill sites also confirmed this finding. 
Siting problems for landfill sites due to public opposition 
often incur delays, and might reduce the economic 
and financial viability of a particular landfill site. The 
nuclear waste management case study also found that 
opposition to major planned infrastructural works can 
result in delays to scheduled works which can increase 
overall costs.
The analysis of the French nuclear programme found 
that there was an important relationship between 
economic and financial viability and variety of pathways 
(E3). In general, costs are an important factor in 
technology choices. For CCS, this is problematic since 
knowledge about the costs of different technology 
variants is currently limited – and the costs of CCS 
technologies are subject to greater uncertainties than 
those of some other low carbon technologies. The French 
nuclear programme was accompanied by an aspiration 
that increasing rates of adoption of a particular design 
might foster learning and economies of scale to bring 
costs down. However, a recent analysis by Grubler (2010) 
shows that the construction costs of PWRs in France 
rose steadily from the early 1970s to 1990s – and more 
than doubled over that period in real terms. In any case, 
the early momentum and experience gained with light 
water reactors such as the PWR made it difficult for other 
technologies catch up. It therefore made this variant 
look economically favourable when compared to other 
designs (Di Nucci Pearce, 1986; Cowan, 1990). The case 
study of FGD in the US also identified links between 
the variety and economic and financial uncertainties. 
There is also an important interaction between safe 
storage and economic and financial viability (E4). 
As the nuclear waste management case shows, 
there is the interplay between the costs involved 
in developing specific storage sites and operational 
safety levels. The cost of developing particular 
sites will need to be balanced carefully against 
the level of containment offered. If storage safety 
is not achieved and carbon leaks into the sea or 
atmosphere, this will impact on the economics of CCS 
projects by increasing liabilities, damaging investor 
confidence and impacting on risk perceptions.
For policy-driven, public good 
technologies like FGD and CCS, 
policy and regulatory uncertainty 
will always be of key importance 
for investment decisions.
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Lastly, there is also a crucial relationship between 
economic and financial viability and scaling and speed 
(E5). The case studies of FGD technology in the United 
States emphasised the role of learning by doing through 
the roll out of the technology. The early stage scaling 
up and deployment of FGD were associated with rising 
costs, but interestingly this also reduced uncertainty 
about costs. The rising costs were primarily caused 
by the discovery of unexpected technical problems. 
Continued development and deployment led to the 
resolution of these problems, and after the late 1970s, 
costs started coming down (see Figure 3.2). The case 
study of the UK dash for gas showed that the rapid roll 
out of CCGTs in the 1990s led to a rapid decrease in CCGT 
investment prices (Colpier and Cornland, 2002). However, 
the history of the CCGT also shows that before that 
period, prices actually increased for some years before 
accumulated experience from the installed capacity 
contributed to learning processes which enabled price 
reductions (Winskel 1998; 2002).
In summary, the analysis of the historical case studies 
identified a range of important interactions between 
uncertainties which are relevant to the development 
and deployment of CCS. Most of these interactions were 
identified in more than one case. Given that most of 
them occurred over long periods of time (eg 20-30 years), 
it is important for decision makers focusing on CCS 
technologies to not only to consider short term concerns, 
but also to keep these longer term dynamics in mind.
Another important lesson learned from the historical 
case analysis of relevance for CCS is that interactions 
between different uncertainties can take three different 
forms. On the basis of the data it is possible  
to distinguish between: 
•  ‘virtuous circles’ - where the resolution or management 
of one uncertainty helps to reduce another uncertainty 
through a process of positive feedback. For example: 
increased perception of safety of storage might lead to 
improved public acceptance
•  ‘vicious circles’ - where the deterioration of one 
uncertainty has negative impacts on another through 
a negative feedback process. For example, where rising 
costs might lead to less policy support and political 
enthusiasm about the technology
•  ‘trade offs’ - where the resolution or management of 
one uncertainty leads to more uncertainty in another 
dimension. For example, we have identified a potential 
trade off between reducing technological variety in 
order to speed up the development and roll out of a 
technology. But this can result in premature lock-in to 
a particular technology variant which might turn out to 
be costly compared to alternatives. Conversely, keeping 
options open and exploring many technology variants 
to enable learning might impede progress with scaling 
up and the speed of development and deployment. It 
might spread resources too thinly to build momentum 
for any variant. Policy decisions might have a key 
influence on this trade-off.
These three different kinds of interdependency between 
the uncertainties have been used by the project team to 
develop some possible future pathways for CCS in the UK 
to 2030. These pathways are analysed in the next section 
of this report.
One of the goals of our project has 
been to contribute to the analysis of 
the conditions for both ‘successful’ 
and ‘unsuccessful’ CCS deployment, 
and what actions by policy makers 
and other decision makers might 
influence the outcome. To that end, 
a set of pathways were developed 
for CCS from now to 2030.
CCS pathways to 2030 
UKERC Research Project: Carbon Capture and Storage: Realising the potential? 33
0 0
34  Chapter 04 CCS pathways to 2030 
One of the goals of our project has been to contribute 
to the analysis of the conditions for both ‘successful’ 
and ‘unsuccessful’ CCS deployment, and what actions 
by policy makers and other decision makers might 
influence the outcome. To that end, a set of pathways 
were developed for CCS from now to 2030.
One of the goals of our project has been to contribute 
to the analysis of the conditions for both ‘successful’ 
and ‘unsuccessful’ CCS deployment, and what 
actions by policy makers and other decision makers 
might influence the outcome. To that end, a set of 
pathways were developed for CCS from now to 2030, 
drawing on CCS policy documents and research 
literature, as well as on the insights gained from the 
analogue case studies, to explore different possible 
CCS futures. The analysis allows the identification 
of key branching points where CCS pathways might 
diverge (or merge), which help illustrate what aspects 
of CCS futures to monitor, and what actions may 
need to be taken to realise desired pathways. 
As discussed in section 3 of this report, the seven 
uncertainties we have identified for CCS are 
related in multiple ways (Markusson, et al., 2012). 
The linkages either represent synergies between 
uncertainties, where improvement in one makes 
improvement in another more likely. Or they depict 
how deterioration in one dimension leads to problems 
relating to another uncertainty. As well as these 
virtuous (and vicious) cycle dynamics, there are also 
instances of trade-offs between uncertainties, where 
improvement in one creates problems somewhere 
else. This kind of interaction is especially important 
to analyse, as it indicates situations where trade-
offs may have to be made by decision-makers. 
A set of three pathway endpoints for 2030 were selected, 
which differ widely in the amount of CCS deployed. 
These endpoints represent situations where we have 
either (1) reached the more ambitious policy targets for 
CCS deployment (and where virtuous cycles have led to 
the resolution of many uncertainties; (2) CCS has failed 
to ‘deliver’ completely (and where vicious cycles have 
led to a multiplication of uncertainties); or (3) an ‘in-
between’ situation where a moderate level of deployment 
has emerged and the success of the technology ‘hangs 
in the balance’. In this third case, there may have been 
trade-offs between uncertainties. To be able to elaborate 
the possible sequence of events to each of these three 
endpoints, a back-casting approach was adopted 
(Robinson, 1982). This develops possible and coherent 
pathways from today’s situation to each of the three 
endpoints. An important starting point is the current 
plan for several large-scale, integrated demonstration 
projects of CCS on power plants. 
Deployment of CCS technologies does not of course 
take place in a vacuum, and the appetite for investment 
in CCS generation is at least partially dependent on 
progress in other low carbon options. For example, CCS 
may look relatively more attractive if the cost reductions 
envisaged for offshore wind do not happen as quickly 
as anticipated or the first new nuclear stations are 
not delivered to time and budget. Clearly, the opposite 
could apply and CCS may look relatively less attractive 
if encouraging progress is made with offshore wind and 
new nuclear. Once deployed, the actual utilisation of CCS 
plants may be affected by the mix of other generation on 
the system. Since plant load factors influence the unit 
cost of electricity generated, this may have important 
implications for the financial viability of CCS plants. Full 
descriptions of the energy system and policy context 
of each pathway, can be found in a separate pathways 
report (Heptonstall, Markusson et al., 2012).
This work does not intend to suggest that any particular 
pathway is more or less probable. Instead, it examines 
a plausible and analytically useful range of potential 
futures which can then be used to help understand how 
far our uncertainties need to be resolved to achieve 
‘successful’ deployment – and also what circumstances 
might prevent this. In this way, the methodology allows 
for analysis of the conditions for both ‘successful’ and 
‘unsuccessful’ CCS deployment by 2030.
Deployment of CCS technologies 
does not of course take place  
in a vacuum, and the appetite  
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options.
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The set of pathways was analysed with the help of the 
uncertainty indicators listed in section 2 of this report 
(see Table 2.1). For each uncertainty and assessment 
indicator, the pathways were compared to see where they 
differ. These differences can be identified as branching 
points between pathways (Foxon, Pearson et al., 2012). 
The branching points can occur at different times in the 
period to 2030, and the comparison was done at five-year 
intervals. As a result of the comparison, a set of four key 
branching points were identified, with implications for 
choices to be made by policy and other decision makers.
As Figure 4.1 shows, the ‘On track’ pathway envisages a 
cumulative deployment of up to 15GW of CCS plant by 
2030. To get to this point, the pathway envisages that 
around 1GW of demonstration plant is operational, with 
a mix of fuels and technologies, by the mid- to late-2010s. 
Subsequent ‘2nd tranche’ projects are in the early stages 
of planning by the late-2010s and by the early-to-mid 
2020s around 3GW of such plants are operational. By this 
time, ‘3rd tranche’ projects are in development, which 
then facilitates CCS plants with a combined capacity of 
around 1.5GW coming into operation each year over a 
period of six or seven years up to 2030. In addition, plans 
for further CCS plants are actively under consideration 
by generating companies at this point (Heptonstall, 
Markusson et al., 2012). Whilst Figure 4.1 assumes a 90% 
load factor to calculate a notional maximum electricity 
generation from CCS, it is of course possible that some of 
these plants may be required to run at lower load factors 
in the future, especially if the alternative is to constrain 
off low or zero marginal cost nuclear or wind power plants 
at times of low demand. Such lower load factors could 
have potentially important financial implications for the 
CCS plants affected (Heptonstall P, Gross R et al., 2011). 
They would also face technical challenges. Whilst several 
strategies have been proposed to improve the flexibility of 
CCS plants (eg solvent storage or the use of bypass stacks), 
these have not yet been fully developed and tested.
The pathways
As noted above, the project team used an analytical 
method based on describing a number of plausible 
deployment pathways for CCS in the UK and identifying 
branching points that differentiate these pathways 
to explore how key uncertainties could affect UK CCS 
deployment up to 2030. The analysis is primarily focused 
on deployment of CCS in the power sector since this is 
aligned with the initial focus of UK Government funding 
and also much of the CCS literature. It also uses policy 
ambition as a starting point for defining ‘on-track’ 
deployment, rather than the higher deployment levels 
suggested by some industry representatives (eg Carbon 
Capture and Storage Association, 2011). The pathways 
are deliberately agnostic with regard to CCS plant fuel 
and technology choices, not because such choices are 
unimportant but because the intention was to focus on 
the insights available from the case studies (Heptonstall, 
Markusson et al., 2012). 
Three pathways were initially selected, although during 
the course of the analysis one of these pathways was 
expanded into two variants in order to illustrate the 
trade off involved in early or late selection of technology 
variants (and a number of other closely related issues 
and choices). The final set of pathways used for the 
analysis was:
Pathway 1 – ‘On track’ 
A broadly successful pathway, with a plausibly high level 
of CCS deployment. By 2030, CCS has an established 
position as a technically proven and financially viable 
option, and is competitive with other low-carbon 
electricity generation technologies.  
 
Pathway 2, Variant A – ‘Momentum lost’  
Commercial-scale demonstration of CCS does go ahead, 
and is followed relatively quickly by further deployment 
up to the mid-2020s. By this time, CCS has established 
itself as technically viable, but from the mid-2020s 
onwards it is not generally a preferred option as part 
of the low-carbon generation mix in the UK. Financial 
viability ends up being marginal. 
 
Pathway 2, Variant B – ‘Slow and sporadic’ 
Commercial-scale demonstration of CCS does go ahead, 
followed by limited further deployment up to 2030. CCS 
has established itself as technically viable, but it is not 
generally a preferred option as part of the low-carbon 
generation mix in the UK. Financial viability remains 
marginal with deployment in particular market niches 
only. 
Pathway 3, ‘Failure’  
No CCS deployment beyond a limited demonstration 
programme.  
The indicative deployment of, and maximum cumulative 
electricity generation from, CCS plant under Pathways 2 
and 3 is shown in Figures 4.1-4.3 page 34.
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The ‘Momentum lost’ pathway envisages up to 
6-7GW of CCS deployment by 2030. The pathway is 
characterised by an encouraging start with around 1GW 
of demonstration plant operational, with a mix of fuels 
and technologies, by the mid-to-late 2010s. This is then 
quickly followed up with up to 5-6GW of ‘extended 2nd 
tranche’ plants operational by the early-to-mid 2020s. 
As the name suggests, CCS deployment then comes to a 
halt (for the reasons described below), so that by the late 
2020s there are no further CCS plants in development. 
Note that Figure 4.2 uses a load factor of 60% during the 
early years of CCS plant operation, to reflect the technical 
challenges encountered during the scaling up for ‘2nd 
tranche’ projects.
The ‘Slow and sporadic’ pathway also envisages up to 
6-7GW of CCS deployment by 2030, but with a different 
deployment trajectory compared to ‘Momentum lost’. 
The pathway begins with slower progress on the 
demonstration projects than the two previous pathways 
with the result that it is the late 2010s before 1GW 
of demonstration plants are operational. This is then 
followed by a rather fitful, although not insignificant 
deployment of a further 5-6GW of ‘2nd tranche’ plants 
during the mid-to-late 2020s. In further contrast to 
‘Momentum lost’, by 2030 some ‘3rd tranche’ plants are 
in the early stages of project development, albeit prior to 
final investment decision.
The final pathway, ‘Failure’, envisages that only two 
demonstration plants are brought to completion, with 
the first being operational by the mid-to-late 2010s, and 
the second by the early 2020s, representing a total of 
less than 1GW of CCS plant. Following this, there are no 
further plants in development in the period up to 2030, 
and no plans for any CCS plants in the post-2030 period.
Pathways and branching points – Applying 
insights from case studies to CCS
This section elaborates the innovation dynamics of the 
pathways in more detail, drawing on insights from the 
case studies. It uses the notation in Table 4.1 to indicate 
how the cases have been used to help develop the 
pathway narratives. The main aim is to highlight key 
pathway characteristics, especially those that reflect case 
study insights. 
Special attention is devoted to the points where the 
pathways diverge, here called branching points, since 
they represent important events to monitor and 
important choices to make. The four pathways and the 
branching points between them are depicted in Figure 
4.4 (and in Figure 4.5). Please note that where pathways 
coincide in terms of cumulative deployment, they may 
well be different in terms of the underlying dynamics 
and the development in other dimensions. Nevertheless, 
the focus here is on ‘financeability’, and the branching 
points of interest are where the pathways diverge 
substantially from each other in terms of deployment 
(for a range of reasons to be discussed below).
Pathway 1 – ‘On Track’
In this pathway all uncertainties are managed 
successfully, and there are virtuous cycle type dynamics 
with advances on one front facilitating improvements 
on others. The key technical features of the pathway 
include a successful UK demonstration programme 
and/or positive experience in other countries. Part of 
this is down to good judgement and part may be sheer 
luck. Choices made to focus on a limited range of 
promising technology varieties turn out to be justified 
and their technical difficulties manageable. The capture 
technology up-scaling required is facilitated by modular 
designs (see Scaling up and speed, US FGD). As regards 
to storage, sufficient potential sites are identified and 
characterised on time for both early and later projects. 
CO2 pipeline routes are successfully built and operated, 
and any required new routes identified. This is facilitated 
by the re-use of natural gas infrastructure (see System 
integration, UK natural gas grid). Early project designs take 
the possibility for regional hubs, as well as international 
inter-connections into account (ibid). 
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form of financial incentives (see Policy, politics & regulation, 
UK FGD) or contracts (see Economics and finance, UK 
LFW). Government and regulators build up considerable 
internal expertise on CCS that is independent of the 
industry. (see Scaling & speed, US FGD; Economics & finance, 
US FGD; Policy, politics & regulation, UK FGD). This helps 
with the formulation of effective policy. Government 
also plays a key role in facilitating the exchange of 
information about the technologies (see Scaling and speed, 
US FGD). 
There was also clear and continuous targeted policy 
support for the ‘2nd tranche’ CCS projects from the late 
2010s onwards (see Economics & finance, Scaling & speed 
US FGD). Positive experience from the demonstration 
projects increases political confidence that CCS can 
play a significant role, and in spite of utility industry 
reluctance in the face of costly investments (see Policy, 
politics & regulation, UK FGD). This is coupled with 
increasing technical concerns over managing the GB 
electricity system with very large fractions of non-
dispatchable wind power and economically inflexible 
nuclear power. As a result, specific attention is paid 
to CCS plant flexibility within the ‘2nd tranche’ – and 
to overcoming technical, economic and regulatory 
constraints to such flexibility.
The costs of CCS technologies are competitive with 
the alternatives. Competition among equipment 
manufacturers contributes to costs being kept in check 
(see Scaling and speed, UK CCGT). Any remaining cost 
differential can be justified by the additional system-
wide benefits which CCS provides over other low-carbon 
generating options, such as flexibility. The electricity 
market is structured so that operators of CCS plants 
are rewarded for these additional benefits. A supportive 
political, policy and financial environment allows CCS 
projects to be competitive and financed through a 
combination of debt and equity. Generating companies 
continue to actively choose CCS to complement their 
other low-carbon generation assets.
This pathway is also characterised by early, 
comprehensive policy support, which together with 
technical progress builds up a momentum that in turn 
facilitates sustained policy support (see Branching Point 
#1), where the ‘On track’ and ‘Momentum lost’ pathways 
diverge from the ‘Slow and sporadic’ pathway’). This 
includes early engagement with local communities, 
which leads to modified projects and allayed fears (see 
Public acceptance, UK natural gas grid) and highlighted local 
benefits. A storage liability regime is set up that is both 
workable for industry (restricted in time and amount, 
no unrealistic criteria) and which inspires confidence 
in the reliability of storage (transparent, economic 
interests kept in check etc). The permitting process 
for early CCS projects proceeds relatively smoothly, 
and all necessary permits are granted without undue 
delay. Deployment is driven by both sticks (a mandate 
or emissions performance standard) and carrots, in the 
Table 4.1 Notation used for the case studies in the pathway narratives
 Uncertainty Country Notation
 Scaling and speed – CCGT UK Scaling & speed, UK CCGT
 Scaling and speed – FGD USA Scaling & speed, US FGD
 Economics and finance – landfill waste UK Economics & finance, UK LFW
 Economics and finance – FGD USA Economics & finance, US FGD
 Variety of pathways – nuclear power France Variety of pathways, FR NP
 Safe storage – nuclear power UK Safe storage, UK NP
 System integration – natural gas grid UK System integration, UK NGG
 Policy, politics and regulation – FGD UK Policy, politics & regulation, UK FGD
 Public acceptance – natural gas grid UK Public acceptance, UK NGG
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Pathway 2A – ‘Momentum lost’
The key differentiating factor in this pathway, as 
compared to the ‘On track’ pathway above, is that a 
strong policy push leads to technical and other choices 
being made – which works well at first but after some 
time turns out to have been the wrong choices for a set 
of possible reasons (see Branching Point #4).
Key technical features include commercial-scale 
demonstration of CCS going ahead, followed relatively 
quickly by further deployment up to the mid-2020s. 
Early focus on one or a few technology variants seems 
to be appropriate at first (see Economics & finance, FGD 
US; Variety of pathways, FR NP; Scaling & speed, UK CCGT). 
However, whilst the UK Government remains supportive 
of CCS, technical challenges are encountered during the 
scaling up for ‘2nd tranche’ projects which raises fresh 
concerns, including poor performance and opposition to 
the resulting increased costs (see below) (see Variety of 
pathways, FR NP; Scaling & speed, UK CCGT; Scaling & speed, 
US FGD; Economic and finance, US FGD).
The relatively bullish early policy, planning and project 
management also sidelines any public protests, but the 
protests snowball and eventually undermine political 
and policy support (see Public acceptance, UK NGG). 
Concerns over public acceptance of further pipeline 
routes grow after very limited consultation on early 
routes (see Public acceptance, UK NGG).
In addition, there has been too little site characterisation, 
so that the initial tranche of storage sites cannot be 
followed by the addition of further sites. Alternatively, 
site selection turns out to have been poorly performed, 
with instances of CO2 leaking, further eroding public 
support (see Safe storage, UK NP). This makes political 
support for CCS less emphatic – which in turn increases 
investor concerns over policy risk. The outcome is that 
CCS establishes itself as technically viable, but from the 
mid-2020s onwards it is not generally a preferred option 
as part of the low-carbon generation mix in the UK. 
Financial viability remains marginal.
Whilst this pathway variant loses momentum, it is not 
impossible that it is followed (after 2030) by a renewed 
policy push, based on a switch to other technology, and 
probably with a bigger emphasis of import of technology 
developed elsewhere, which is successful and leads to 
further deployment (see Variety of pathways, FR NP). 
Implicit in this is that effective international knowledge 
sharing and well-functioning international supply chains 
mean that the UK is well prepared to benefit from the 
import of technology variants which have been proved  
to work well elsewhere (see Policy, politics & regulation, 
UK FGD; Variety of pathways, FR NP). 
Pathway 2B – ‘Slow and sporadic’
In the case of this pathway, CCS gets off to a somewhat 
hesitant start - see Branching Point #1, where this 
pathway diverges from the ‘On track’ and ‘Momentum 
lost’ pathways, and Branching Point #2, where it 
diverges also from the ‘Failure’ pathway. There is policy 
support, and experimentation across a wide range 
of technology variants. The key technical features 
include the identification of a range of potential storage 
sites although the fraction that is sufficiently well-
characterised in a timely manner is limited. Some CO2 
pipeline routes are successfully built and operated, 
but progress is slower than expected. Reasons for this 
include delays with permitting, and in some places 
poorly-executed public engagement and successful 
opposition campaigns (see Public acceptance, UK NGG) 
rather than technical problems. Insufficient policy 
support undermined long-term planning and leads 
to a failure to facilitate collective, long-term planning 
and sizing for pipeline networks, which makes them 
unnecessarily expensive. A further contributing factor is 
the difficulty in coordinating and organising the different 
kinds of expertise needed for making a CCS system work, 
slowing down system integration (see System integration, 
UK NGG). During the 2010s, subdued UK economic growth 
focuses attention on the costs to consumers and the 
impact on industrial competitiveness of relatively high-
cost and unproven CCS. By the mid-2010s only one or 
two CCS demonstration plants are operational (although 
further demonstration plants are under construction), 
which delays cost reductions from learning-by-doing.
The result is that the policy support required for ‘2nd 
tranche’ CCS projects becomes politically challenging 
during the latter half of the 2010s. Whilst some support 
is forthcoming, it is only sufficient for a limited 
number of ‘2nd tranche’ projects (ie those that benefit 
from a fortuitous combination of project-specific 
characteristics). Continued uncertainty about the market 
– in the UK and beyond – limits the ability of domestic 
industry to build and maintain capabilities (see Scaling 
& speed, US FGD). Faltering political will leads to policy 
capture by reluctant operators of unabated fossil-fuel 
power plants and nuclear developers, which contributes 
to delays (see Policy, politics & regulation, UK FGD).
CCS had only limited financial viability in the 2020s. 
Early estimates about costs turn out to be too optimistic. 
Cost escalation is driven by unforeseen technical 
problems relating to scaling (see Scaling & speed, US FGD; 
Economics & finance, US FGD) and system integration, 
as well as by continued controversy about risk sharing 
and funding. Deriving business models which provide 
appropriate incentives to all the actors in the CCS 
A supportive political, policy  
and financial environment  
allows CCS projects to be  
competitive and financed 
through a combination of  
debt and equity.
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chain, and contractual arrangements which ensure the 
necessary cooperation and risk-sharing between actors, 
is also more challenging than anticipated. The costs 
and risks of CCS technologies (after taking account of 
low-carbon support mechanisms) are only competitive 
with the alternatives in relatively rare niches or project-
specific circumstances. For example, this could include 
a particularly fortuitous combination of site availability, 
connection to a revenue-generating enhanced oil 
recovery project, suitability for retrofit, and availability of 
regional policy support. Depleted hydrocarbon fields are 
also more attractive than saline formations, because CO2 
storage could delay any regulated liabilities from earlier 
hydrocarbon exploration, and so offset moderate storage 
related liabilities (see Economics and finance, UK LFW). 
As a worst case scenario, the lingering problems may 
be compounded by mismanaged public consultations 
on CCS, which lead to widespread opposition. The 
momentum of development may not be sufficient,  
and there is no more deployment from the early 2020s 
(see Branching Point #3).
The comparatively long period of experimentation could 
lead to improvements accumulating and CCS becoming 
more and more attractive, but the main deployment 
effect of that would only be seen after 2030, which is 
much later than current policy and industry aspirations.
Pathway 3 – ‘Failure’
In this pathway, CCS encounters one or more ‘show 
stoppers’, and an insufficient reduction in several of the 
seven uncertainties. One possible mechanism for this is  
a vicious circle of problems that reinforce each other,  
and drain the momentum from the innovation process 
(see Branching Point #2). 
The problems encountered include both technical and 
social ones. Integration, scale up and optimisation of 
the components in the full generation and CCS chain 
encounters substantially more technical challenges 
than anticipated. The overall impact is that the first 
demonstration projects incur significantly higher costs 
than originally envisaged. This experience is replayed in 
Any remaining cost differential 
can be justified by the additional 
system-wide benefits which  
CCS provides over other low-
carbon generating options,  
such as flexibility.
subsequent demonstration project(s) since a different 
suite of technologies are employed, which limits the 
scope for learning from the first projects (see Variety of 
pathways, FR NP – the early years of focus on gas cooled, 
graphite reactors). Moreover, those CO2 pipeline routes 
that are built encounter significant public opposition. 
People react against the uncertainties of the novel CO2 
transporting phenomenon, as well as against clumsy 
attempts at consultation that do not engage with or offer 
any real influence and benefit to local communities
(see Public acceptance, UK NGG). Appraisal optimism of 
storage sites becomes a millstone when the true costs 
of re-engineering and monitoring existing hydrocarbon 
fields to meet stringent EU performance regulations 
become apparent. Few additional storage sites can then 
find commercial investors, and so UK storage resources 
remain large but commercial reserves are too small for 
significant impact. This contributes to public confidence 
evaporating.
The outcome is a failure of CCS to take off. The 
delays and the revealed poor performance of the CCS 
technologies erode support for this mitigation option, 
so that it is dropped from the climate policy agenda 
given the urgency of achieving emissions reductions. 
The ‘big six’ UK electricity generators are preoccupied 
with new build of nuclear, renewables and (unabated 
but relatively low-carbon) CCGT, and in the absence of a 
full CCS demonstration programme and with continued 
strong policy support for proven alternatives, they do 
not prioritise investment in CCS. Decreased use of 
fossil fuels also contributes to declining enthusiasm for 
CCS demonstration projects (even though a significant 
proportion of the electricity delivered in the UK is still 
from unabated fossil-fired plants, with the accompanying 
emissions which that implies). An increased diversity 
of UK gas delivery mechanisms and storage options 
reduced exposure to gas price volatility, and so reduced 
the perceived value of coal-fired CCS as a hedge against 
potentially high and volatile gas prices. Generators 
remained largely able to pass gas price increases through 
to consumers so that unabated gas remains competitive 
in the market and continues to provide a balancing role 
(even though the relatively low gas prices may not last).
It is interesting to note that few of the lessons from the 
uncertainties case studies appear to connect directly 
to this ‘Failure’ pathway. This may be because (with the 
arguable exception of Safe storage, UK NP) the analogues 
selected for study in Work Package 2 did not generally 
have a final outcome of failure. But, it also illustrates that 
quite serious challenges can be overcome with enough 
political will and societal support, at least over time.
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Branching Points
The design of the pathways, as elaborated above, 
helped the project team analyse the time scales 
involved, and suggests a set of ‘branching points’ 
where the pathways may diverge, as noted above in 
the pathways descriptions. Figure 4.5 summarises the 
four key branching points (the blue boxes) analysed. 
This analysis helps to highlight events that are worth 
monitoring, and to identify choices that need to be made. 
Branching Point #1 represents a choice between strong, 
comprehensive early policy support or a more limited 
and partial approach. Branching Point #2 is where a 
‘Failure’ pathway branches off, either as a result of 
political will being too weak, or through the emergence 
of a ‘show stopper issue’ of a technical or social kind. 
In between these two branching points, there is the 
‘Slow and sporadic’ pathway with a moderate level of 
policy support and moderately successful development 
work, which – with a combination of luck and prudent 
planning – could lead to a deployment in specific market 
niches the late 2020s. Branching Point #3 illustrates 
that there is a need for sustained success and progress 
unless the pathway is to grind to a halt in the 2020s.
Leftmost in Figure 4.5 is the ‘On track’ pathway 
where CCS develops the strongest momentum, 
through all the uncertainties improving. The final 
branching point, Branching Point #4, suggests that 
if early progress is achieved through the cutting 
of too many corners, and premature selection of 
technology variants, there is a risk of a backlash in 
the (late) 2020s and the momentum being lost.
4.5 Pathways and branching points
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Conclusions and policy  
implications
CCS technologies continue to face 
multiple uncertainties. Events in 
the UK and abroad since we started 
our research reinforce the need to 
analyse these uncertainties, and 
possible ways in which they could 
be overcome.
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CCS technologies continue to face multiple uncertainties. 
Events in the UK and abroad since we started our research 
reinforce the need to analyse these uncertainties, and 
possible ways in which they could be overcome. 
The UK government has continued its commitment to 
CCS, and has re-launched its demonstration programme. 
But at the time of writing, this has not yet resulted in a 
firm agreement to fund a specific demonstration project.
In autumn 2011, the planned Scottish Power 
demonstration at the Longannet power plant became 
the latest CCS project to be cancelled. The government-
funded design studies for the Longannet project and a 
second planned project at Kingsnorth (which was also 
cancelled) helped to identify uncertainties in more detail. 
Government and industry argue that some of these 
uncertainties, such as those associated with capital 
costs, have been reduced. However, the cancellation of 
Longannet showed that the anticipated costs were higher 
than the £1bn available from public funds. Furthermore, 
as the recent National Audit Office report on the 
demonstration competition points out, it ‘took place 
against an evolving background of economic, policy and 
regulatory uncertainty’ (NAO, 2012: 8).
The spotlight has now shifted to other CCS projects 
that are now vying for funds under the new CCS 
commercialisation programme. Despite continuing 
public commitments to CCS from Ministers, and the 
publication of the CCS roadmap, policy uncertainties 
are likely to remain a particular concern for investors. 
The coincidence of the demonstration programme 
with the broader Electricity Market Reform process 
offers an additional source of revenue for CCS projects. 
However, there is some way to go before the first projects 
can proceed to a final investment decision. A further 
complication is that it is not clear which projects will 
receive additional funding under the EU NER 300 process. 
The problems facing CCS technologies are not just 
apparent in the UK (Global CCS Institute, 2011). Other 
countries have also encountered difficulties in realising 
their potential. In the Netherlands and Germany, public 
opposition to onshore storage of CO2 has meant that 
projects have been put on hold or cancelled. In the USA 
too, there has been slow progress with many projects, 
including some of those that have been promised 
financial support by the Federal government. There have 
been some positive developments too. The Dutch ‘ROAD’ 
project, which is a 250MW power plant with CCS, is 
coming close to a positive final investment decision. This 
has funding from the European Energy Recovery Plan and 
the Dutch government, and has not applied for the EU 
NER 300 process. 
As noted in the introduction to this report, two full scale 
power plants with CCS are under construction in the 
United States and Canada, with a planned operational 
date of 2014 in each case. In both cases, public funding 
is being provided in the form of capital grants, and 
enhanced oil recovery will increase revenues.
In view of these persistent uncertainties and the slow 
progress with many planned projects, what insights can 
our research offer for policy and other decision makers? 
There are some important general lessons. First, our 
historical case studies show that uncertainties can be 
reduced sufficiently for progress to be made. In some 
cases, they can be resolved entirely. This offers some 
optimism that, given the right set of circumstances, 
the uncertainties that affect CCS can also be dealt with 
over time. However, we have also emphasised that care 
is needed when learning from historical contexts that 
differ widely from the current situation in the UK in 
important institutional, policy and economic respects. It 
is important to consider the limitations revealed by the 
analogues in relation to CCS, as well as the lessons they 
can teach us.
A second general conclusion from our analysis is that 
interactions between uncertainties matter. They can 
reinforce each other, both positively and negatively. 
There can also be tradeoffs between uncertainties where 
attempts to resolve one uncertainty could result in the 
exacerbation of others. This reinforces the need for a 
systemic analysis of emerging technologies such as CCS, 
to complement more specific research on particular 
technical, economic, policy and social issues. In the 
pathway analysis presented in section 4 of this report, 
we have highlighted how particular tradeoffs between 
uncertainties can make a significant difference to 
outcomes for CCS. For example, the variants of pathway 
2 explore some of the risks of a strong policy that pushes 
technology development down a specific route – and how 
this strategy may lead to a backlash, and an eventual 
stalling of progress.
The problems facing CCS  
technologies are not just apparent 
in the UK (Global CCS Institute, 
2011). Other countries have  
also encountered difficulties in  
realising their potential. 
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A third and final general lesson is that the resolution 
of all uncertainties is not required for CCS to be 
financeable in the UK. Similarly, the derailing of plans  
to realise the potential of CCS may not require 
everything to go wrong – but this could be caused 
by a ‘critical mass’ of uncertainties persisting for too 
long. When discussing technologies like CCS that are 
characterised by pervasive uncertainties, it is tempting 
to feel that all risks must be dealt with by government 
before progress can be made. But that assumption 
is mistaken, and forgets that the private sector 
routinely deals with multiple risks. If new low-carbon 
technologies such as CCS are to be part of our low-
carbon future, the role of policy frameworks is not to 
remove all uncertainties, but to identify those risks that 
would not be tackled in the absence of intervention. 
Maximising the probability of an ‘on track’ 
pathway to 2030
DECC has recently reframed the main aim of their 
policies to support CCS. The CCS commercialisation 
programme emphasises more clearly that full scale 
demonstrations are a means to an end. In some ways, 
this encapsulates the approach we have explored through 
our ‘on track’ pathway, in which CCS is successfully 
demonstrated and deployed in the period to 2030. In a 
recent presentation to the industry, the chief executive  
of DECC’s Office of CCS summarised this aim as follows: 
‘As a result of the intervention, private sector electricity 
companies can take investment decisions to build CCS 
equipped fossil fuel power stations, in the early 2020s, 
without Government capital subsidy, at an agreed CfD 
strike price that is in line with the strike prices for other 
low carbon generation technologies’  
(Dawson, 2011).
To achieve this aim requires comprehensive policy 
support now. Whilst the CCS roadmap promises 
such comprehensive support, the commercialisation 
programme needs to yield firm commitments to build 
several full scale CCS projects as soon as possible. 
Without this progress, uncertainties will persist. UK 
investors would effectively be relying on taxpayers and/
or energy consumers in other countries to support CCS 
across the ‘valley of death’ to commercial availability.  
In view of the difficulties being experienced 
internationally, this is a highly risky strategy. It 
would also mean that the UK would be less likely 
to reap other industrial development benefits. 
Table 5.1 summarises some specific actions that could 
be taken by government and other actors to address 
the uncertainties we have analysed in this report. We 
recognise that many of these actions are already being 
taken as set out in the CCS roadmap. It is important to 
consider them as an overall ‘package’ – and to assess 
whether some of these uncertainties require more 
attention than they have received so far.
Our historical case studies 
show that uncertainties can be 
reduced sufficiently for progress 
to be made. In some cases, 
they can be resolved entirely.
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Key uncertainties
1. Variety of pathways
2. Safe storage
3. Scaling up and speed of 
development and deployment
4. Integration of CCS systems
5. Economic and financial viability
6. Policy, politics and regulation
7. Public acceptance
Recommended actions
The UK CCS demonstration programme should support a limited number 
of different technologies and fuels to enable learning about their relative 
merits (government).
Potential storage sites should be characterised in detail (storage site 
operators; government).
An appropriate regime for CO2 storage liabilities is required that strikes a 
balance between the public and private sectors (government; storage site 
operators).
Scaling up does not only require an increase in size of individual 
components, but also their integration and some technology transfer from 
other applications (CCS equipment suppliers).
Government should be prepared for technical problems and cost increases 
that might accompany scaling up and early deployment. Support 
programmes should be regularly evaluated (government). 
Targeted public R&D support and knowledge sharing can help to address 
scaling up challenges (government, CCS equipment suppliers).
The deployment of CCS should take into account the potential for regional 
and international pipeline networks (CCS project developers; government; 
pipeline companies).
The social and organisational challenges of CCS system integration 
require appropriate business models, risk sharing arrangements, and 
the integration of different areas of expertise (CCS project consortia; 
government).
Several full scale demonstration projects should be supported by public 
funds, and their costs published (government, developers). 
Financial support for CCS should include long-term contracts to reduce 
risks and encourage performance (government).
A regulatory approach is unlikely to be sufficient to support CCS 
deployment. Mandating CCS in the near future would be premature, though 
this option should be kept under review (government).
Substantial analytical and other capabilities are required within 
government to understand the impacts of policy implementation, and to 
negotiate with industry (government).
Some flexibility is needed in the implementation of regulations and funding 
programmes, but this should be underpinned by a clear commitment to CCS 
deployment (government).
There should be fair, transparent processes for the siting of CCS plants, CO2 
transport infrastructure and storage reservoirs (government; prospective 
storage operators, independent bodies).
Table 5.1: Recommendations for policies and strategies
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The pathways analysis in section 4 of this report also 
provides a more dynamic perspective on some of the actions 
summarised in Table 5.1. Through this analysis, we have 
highlighted a number of specific ‘branching points’. These 
are points in time where we have assumed that certain 
conditions have been met, and actions taken, in order for 
CCS deployment to continue along our ‘on track’ pathway. 
They include:
•  By 2015, strong policy support for CCS demonstrations 
has been provided, and some are under construction.
Additional actions that have been taken include 
thorough public engagement, a comprehensive 
programme of storage site characterisation and network 
design modifications to prepare for future CO2 grid.
•  By 2020, lessons from the first demonstration projects 
have been used to inform the design of policy support 
mechanisms for a ‘second tranche’ of full-scale CCS 
projects. Policy and stakeholder actions are assumed 
to lead to the initial operation of some of these second 
tranche CCS plants by 2020.
•  By 2025, operating experience has been gained with 
commercial-scale plants. This has meant significant 
technical progress, and CCS plants are now financially 
viable under the prevailing market and policy 
framework for the electricity sector. Policy-makers and 
other key actors (particularly consumers) decide that 
CCS should play a significant role in the UK’s climate 
change mitigation portfolio.
Navigating policy choices and dilemmas 
Whilst the ‘on track’ pathway describes how many 
of the uncertainties facing CCS could be resolved in 
future, we have stressed that it is not meant to be a 
prediction or a prescription for action. The reality of 
policies to support CCS in the UK is likely to be much less 
straightforward. Our analysis has highlighted difficult 
choices that have to be made by government and other 
decision makers. In many cases, it is unclear what 
course of action is preferable to maximise the chances 
that the government’s desired outcome will be achieved. 
Taken together, our historical case studies and pathways 
analysis highlight four areas where government and 
other decision makers have such choices to make. 
1. Keeping options open or closing them down?
Our research has shown that whilst strong policy signals 
and support would be required to reduce uncertainty 
and give CCS a good start, there are also risks associated 
with accelerated innovation and deployment – especially 
if this leads to the cutting of corners. For example, 
it is tempting to focus efforts and resources on one 
technological variety early on as the French government 
did when picking the PWR for its nuclear programme. 
This may help to speed up development, but comes with 
increased risks of picking weak, unreliable or expensive 
technology. Similarly, there may be a temptation to 
choose convenient and cheap storage options for the first 
projects. If due consideration is not given to ensuring the 
safety and reliability of storage, there are risks of cost 
increases from remediation expenditure and liability 
payouts, as well as a backlash in public opinion. It may 
also be tempting to try to bypass local opinion and wide 
stakeholder engagement. Whilst it may well be possible 
to force through early projects, this strategy means that 
there is a risk of protests growing over time. This does 
not mean that strong policy push and brave choices are 
wrong, but it does mean that stronger push and speedier 
policy action have significant risks.
Our conclusion on this point is that it is too early for 
government and industry to close down on a particular 
variant of CCS technology. The National Audit Office 
report on the competition to build the UK’s first CCS 
demonstration plant stated that the original focus on 
coal-fired plants with post combustion CCS was a source 
of inflexibility in the negotiations with bidders (NAO, 
2012). In our view, this specific focus was a mistake. It is 
therefore welcome that government funding is proposed 
to support a wider variety of fuels and technologies. 
The important thing is to make sure that any projects 
that are supported are substantial, and allow crucial 
uncertainties associated with scaling up and system 
integration to be tackled effectively.
2. Which public policy incentives for CCS demonstration 
and deployment?
As we have seen from some of our historical case 
studies, there is often a menu of options available for 
public policy support of emerging technologies. An 
important lesson from the case of FGD technology in 
the United States is that a regulatory approach that 
effectively mandates a technology can be contentious. 
It will only work if the technology is sufficiently well 
developed and the additional costs can be passed on to 
consumers. CCS technologies are not yet at this stage. 
Any mandating of CCS now is unlikely to be effective – 
and would simply mean a shift of investor attention to 
other, less risky power generation technologies. It will 
not be easy to identify when the time is right to mandate 
CCS on fossil fuel power plants - a measure that should 
arguably apply to existing plants too as climate change 
targets begin to bite. However, the government’s recent 
decision to guarantee that new gas-fired plants will be 
able to operate without CCS until 2045 is too generous 
(DECC, 2012). If gas continues to be the technology of 
choice for investors in the UK, and a large number of new 
plants are ‘grandfathered’ in this way, they could use 
up a significant proportion of the UK’s planned carbon 
budget – especially in the 2030s and 2040s. 
In the meantime, our research suggests that the 
government is right to emphasise the need for 
demonstration to determine whether and how many 
of the uncertainties we have identified can be reduced. 
Within this, two considerations are important. First, 
there is a need to ensure that any demonstrations that 
are built have some incentive to maximise performance 
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in terms of costs and efficiency. Otherwise, there is a 
risk that demonstration becomes the end of the process 
rather than a step towards the government’s aspiration 
that CCS should be competitive with other low carbon 
electricity generation options. The proposed UK policy 
approach that blends capital subsidies with revenue 
support via contracts for difference is therefore welcome. 
Second, the support of more than one demonstration 
will be an important risk management strategy for 
government and industry. Early projects should be 
encouraged to test different aspects of CCS including 
different fuels, capture technologies, and types of 
storage site. At this stage of development, some CCS 
demonstrations may not perform as well as developers 
hope. Failures are inevitable, so it would be very unwise 
to put all our public finance into one project. At the same 
time, there is a need to ensure that scarce funding is not 
spread too thinly. This reinforces the importance of co-
ordinating the timing of any funding from the contracts 
for difference with the availability of capital funding 
during this Comprehensive Spending Review period. It 
also underlines the need to pay attention to international 
efforts to develop and deploy CCS technologies, and  
to identify the industrial development opportunities  
for ‘UK plc’.
3. CCS deployment as a marathon, not a sprint 
Our case studies of FGD and gas-fired power plant 
technology reinforce a general lesson from the 
experience of energy technology innovation – namely 
that innovation can take a long time. This is not a 
welcome feature of the innovation process given the 
urgency of energy policy imperatives such as the need for 
climate change mitigation. In addition to this, our cases 
have also shown that the costs of new technologies do 
not inevitably fall from the first day these technologies 
are deployed. In some cases (eg nuclear power), there is 
evidence that costs have done the opposite – and have 
progressively risen (Grubler, 2011). Whilst learning can 
bring down costs, our FGD case showed that costs rose 
for a decade in the United States before they started to 
fall. Technical problems were an important driver of the 
evolution of costs. They also affected CCGT technology 
as it was scaled up. It is likely that CCS technologies 
will also experience some teething problems as they are 
deployed at scale, and it would not be surprising if this 
led to costs which are higher than expected. 
The implication of this is that there is a need for patience 
amongst policy makers and industry. International 
developments may help CCS technologies to overcome 
any technical problems more quickly, but this is by no 
means guaranteed. From a public policy perspective, it 
is therefore important to keep a close eye on costs and 
technical progress to inform decisions on whether to 
continue with public funding – or, if there is little sign 
of positive progress over a prolonged period of time, 
when to cut our losses and focus resources on other 
technologies that are more promising. Whilst the plan 
for an industry-led CCS Cost Reduction Task Force is 
welcome, it is also important for government to retain 
a significant independent capability to assess industry 
claims about costs. After all, committing substantial 
public funding to a particular technology such as CCS has 
opportunity costs. It means that less money is available 
to support other low carbon options – whether they are 
large scale power plant technologies or investments in 
energy efficiency and more decentralised energy supply 
technologies. The branching points we identify in section 
4 of this report suggest when some of these important 
decisions may need to be made. 
 
4. Dealing with storage liabilities
A final dilemma concerns the treatment of liabilities 
for stored CO2. Our case study of UK nuclear waste 
management policy has highlighted how complex 
liability arrangements can be, and the history in that 
case of not dealing with liabilities effectively. The current 
DECC budget is testament to this, and is dominated by 
commitments to spend scarce resources to deal with the 
UK’s nuclear legacy. For CCS, it is possible to learn from 
this experience – and to put in place more appropriate 
arrangements. Liabilities for investors cannot be open 
ended if they are to be expected to invest in CCS projects. 
However, future taxpayers need to be protected from an 
un-necessary level of exposure to these liabilities.
Our research does not provide a specific conclusion 
on where this balance should be struck – and how 
liabilities should be shared between project developers 
and the public sector. However, the nuclear waste 
management case suggests some possible features of 
a sound liabilities regime. Some of these features are 
already incorporated into the EU CCS Directive. There 
is a need for agreement about the length of time a 
storage site operator will be responsible for their site, 
and at what point responsibility should revert back to 
the state. There is also a strong case for setting up a 
segregated, independently managed fund which storage 
site operators would pay into over time. This would 
help to pay for the costs of long-term management that 
would otherwise be wholly borne by future taxpayers. In 
addition, the limits to liability for accidental leakages of 
CO2 need to be established, with appropriate collective 
insurance arrangements for developers. It is therefore 
important that the government concludes its planned 
assessment of storage liabilities quickly, and builds on 
this to develop suitable arrangements to manage them. 
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Appendix A:  
Project interviewees
Representatives of the following organisations were 
interviewed to help identify and select assessment 
indicators that were used to analyse the historical  
case studies. The interviews were undertaken during 
the spring and summer of 2010:
•  Department of Energy  
and Climate Change
• Environment Agency
•  Scottish Environment  
Protection Agency
• Climate Change Capital
• European Investment Bank
• Ecofin
• Scottish and Southern Energy
• Doosan Babcock
• ARUP
• TUV NEL
• Mott MacDonald
• McGrigors
•  University College London,  
Faculty of Laws
•  An independent expert  
with long experience in  
the insurance industry
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